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ANALYSIS OF COMPETITION IN THE MOBILE PHONE MARKETS OF THE UNITED STATES 
AND EUROPE 
 
Competition in an economic context is a widely studied phenomenon with a significant body of 
accumulated research and theory. However, competition in the mobile phone industry, despite its 
prevalence in public discussion, has received significantly less attention in academic research. Within the 
international business (IB) context there are very few academic studies that seek to analyze and compare 
the different geographical mobile phone markets from the viewpoint of competition.  
 
This thesis examines competition in the mobile phone markets of the United States and Europe in light of 
interviews and secondary data covering years 2002 - 2011. The framework used for the analysis is 
founded on concepts drawn primarily from industrial organization (IO) economics, IB theory and micro-
economics. The first part of the thesis gives an overview of the U.S. and European mobile phone markets 
and the second part focuses specifically on Nokia, its actions and performance on the U.S. market. 
 
The findings reveal that the U.S. and European mobile phone markets are fundamentally different. Firstly, 
while in Europe several parallel sales channels exist, the U.S. market is dominated by mobile operators 
that control access to the end customer. Secondly, in the U.S. market phones are generally sold heavily 
subsidized and bundled, and either under the operator brand or co-branding agreements. In addition, the 
U.S. market has historically split in two technologies, GSM and CDMA, as opposed to Europe where 
GSM is the dominant technology. 
 
The analysis of Nokia in the United States shows that the company’s problems appear to be related to the 
very characteristics of the U.S. market and the way Nokia has reacted. First and foremost, Nokia has had 
a difficult relationship with the operators who have required tailoring, technology variations etc. In 
addition to its focus on GSM, Nokia seems to have refused to tailor for operators and insisted on sales 
under the Nokia brand. Finally, over the years, Nokia’s situation has been complicated by occasional 
disputes related e.g. to immaterial property rights and recently problems in developing and having 
operators represent especially Nokia’s high-end models. 
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AALTO YLIOPISTON KAUPPAKORKEAKOULU    TIIVISTELMÄ 
Johtamisen ja kansainvälisen liiketoiminnan laitos 
Pro gradu -tutkielma 
 
YHDYSVALTOJEN JA EUROOPAN MATKAPUHELINMARKKINOIDEN KILPAILU-ANALYYSI 
 
Kilpailu taloustieteellisessä kontekstissa on laajasti tutkittu ilmiö, jonka alueella on tehty mittava määrä 
tieteellistä tutkimusta. Matkapuhelintoimialan kilpailu sen sijaan, huolimatta sen saamasta yleisestä 
huomiosta, on jäänyt merkittävästi vähemmälle huomiolle akateemisessa tutkimuksessa. Kansainvälisen 
liiketoiminnan alueella on julkaistu vain vähän tutkimuksia, jotka analysoisivat tai vertailisivat eri 
maantieteellisiä matkapuhelinmarkkinoita kilpailun näkökulmasta. 
 
Tässä työssä tarkastellaan kilpailua Yhdysvaltojen ja Euroopan matkapuhelinmarkkinoilla haastatteluihin 
ja sekundäärisen lähdeaineistoon pohjautuen kattaen vuodet 2002 - 2011. Työssä käytetty analyyttinen 
viitekehys pohjautuu teollisten organisaatioiden taloustieteen (IO), kansainvälisen kaupan ja 
mikrotaloustieteen malleihin. Työn ensimmäinen osa luo katsauksen USA:n ja Euroopan 
matkapuhelinmarkkinoihin, kun taas toinen osa keskittyy Nokiaan, sen toimiin ja menestykseen 
Yhdysvalloissa. 
 
Työn tulokset osoittavat USA:n ja Euroopan matkapuhelinmarkkinoiden poikkeavan oleellisesti 
toisistaan. Ensiksi, Euroopan markkinalla on lukuisia rinnakkaisia myyntikanavia, kun taas 
Yhdysvalloissa operaattorit dominoivat jakeluketjua ja kontrolloivat pääsyä loppuasiakkaalle. Toiseksi, 
USA:ssa puhelimet myydään tyypillisesti operaattorin tavaramerkille räätälöityinä ja vahvasti 
subventoituina kytkykaupan ollessa pääasiallinen toimintamalli. Lisäksi, Yhdysvaltojen markkina on 
jakautunut GSM ja CDMA teknologioihin, kun taas Euroopassa GSM on ollut hallitseva. 
 
Työn aineiston analyysi osoittaa, että Nokian ongelmat ovat liittyneet erityisesti Yhdysvaltojen 
markkinan erityispiirteisiin ja siihen, miten Nokia on toiminut suhteessa näihin. Eritoten Nokialla on ollut 
vaikeuksia operaattorisuhteissaan liittyen puhelinten räätälöintiin operaattoreille, teknologiavariaatioihin 
jne. GSM:ään keskittymisen lisäksi vaikuttaa, että Nokia on ollut haluton mukauttamaan puhelimiaan 
operaattorien vaatimukseen ja vaatinut oman tavaramerkkinsä käyttöä. Vuosien mittaan Nokian tilannetta 
ovat myös vaikeuttaneet riidat liittyen immateriaalioikeuksiin ja viimeaikaiset ongelmat kalliimpien 
mallien kehityksessä ja saattamisessa operaattorien myytäväksi. 
 
 
Avainsanat: Kilpailu, matkapuhelintoimiala, Yhdysvallat, Eurooppa  
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1. Introduction 
 
The introduction of the 1st generation of mobile handsets and networks in the early 
1980s started a gradual but irreversible process that has fundamentally changed the way 
people communicate. What was originally seen as a complementary and later substitute 
means to fixed-line telephony has over the 2nd, 3rd and now 4th generation of mobile 
communications transformed into an irreplaceable part of people’s lives in every 
continent with close to 4,6 billion worldwide users (ITU, 2010) and global annual unit 
sales exceeding 1,1 billion in 2009. (Nokia, 2010c) Where in developing countries 
calling and basic messaging still dominate, in more advanced countries phones are used 
in many professional and personal contexts including, for example, exchange of e-
mails, photography, Internet and social media. 
 
This tremendous change has been enabled by technological advances in areas such as 
electronics and telecommunications produced by hundreds of universities and 
companies around the world, but still much of the credit should be directed to those 
companies involved in the very business. Mobile handset manufacturers, Nokia in the 
forefront, invest tens of billions of euros each year and employ tens of thousands of 
people in positions related to handset development. As of December 21, 2009, Nokia 
alone employed 17 196 people in research and development (R&D) with R&D related 
expenses totaling 5,909 billion euros. (Nokia, 2010b) Recently, however, the 
standardization of electronic components and increase in in-built processing power has 
shifted R&D focus strongly from hardware to software favoring companies traditionally 
strong in software R&D. 
 
In part due to the transformation of the mobile phone industry, the competition in 
handset manufacturing has become increasingly intensive and aggressive. The increased 
software focus has lowered barriers to entry related to hardware expertise and attracted 
several new entrants such as HTC, Apple and Google to the market. Simultaneously, the 
mobile phone business has moved towards competition of mobile eco systems 
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comprising phones, mobile operating systems, application stores, cloud services, etc. 
further increasing the complexity and dynamic nature of the industry. 
 
This transformation has taken place gradually over a few years on all technologically 
advanced markets including Europe and the United States. Even though the two markets 
present similar levels of sophistication in terms of actors, purchasing power etc. the 
development of these markets has taken two different routes both technology-wise and 
related to market structure and competition. While in the European mobile phone 
market handset manufacturers utilize a wide range of marketing and distribution 
channels to reach the end customer, the mobile operator dominance over the distribution 
network in the United States forces handset manufacturers to cooperate with the 
operators who constitute the only major sales channel.  
 
In addition to the differences in the market composition the European and U.S. 
operators have partly opted for different cellular technologies. While in Europe, the 
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) has been the dominant technology, 
two out of the four biggest U.S. operators have adopted a competing technology Code 
Division Multiple Access (CDMA). These and other more subtle differences of the 
European and U.S. mobile phone markets have necessitated distinct approaches to each 
market on the part of the handset manufacturers.  
 
This thesis contributes to the on-going discussion on competition and competitive 
dynamics in the mobile handset industry by carrying out an analysis of the markets of 
Europe and the United States with a special focus on the case of Nokia in the United 
States. Especially, the thesis will make an effort to analyze the roots of Nokia’s failure 
to gain and retain its market share in the United States despite its dominant position in 
most of the world.  
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1.1. Research gap 
 
Despite the extensive news coverage (see Appendix II) and the scope of market and 
company analyses on the mobile handset industry, the availability of rigorous academic 
research is scarce. This is especially true in regard to analyses that focus on the 
European and U.S. mobile phone markets and/or the performance of individual 
companies in these markets. This is a finding of interest since, somewhat surprisingly, 
the mobile operator industry (as opposed to the mobile handset industry) has already 
gained significant academic attention and the body of research is substantial. This 
research covers wide range of topics, for instance, competition between operators 
(Cricelli, Grimaldi & Ghiron, 2008; Fernández & Usero, 2009), operator strategies 
(Peppard & Rylander, 2006; Kiiski. & Hämmäinen, 2004), and customer retention and 
loyalty (Kim & Yoon, 2004; Gerpott & Rams, 2001). 
 
Another neighboring industry with a solid research base is the personal computer (PC) 
business. Bresnahan & Greenstein (1999) analyzed the technological competition in the 
PC industry focusing on the importance of platforms (e.g. Apple Macintosh vs. IBM). 
This research could serve as a basis for similar research related to the operating systems 
or application development environments in the mobile handset industry. Other studies 
have focused e.g. on the effect of advertising in the PC industry (Goeree, 2008) and on 
the formation of the industry in the United States (Haigh, 2010). Malerba et al. (2008) 
presented a model for analyzing the varying vertical integration of computer firms over 
time. It should still be noted that the research on mobile operator and PC industries is 
not, obviously, directly applicable to the mobile handset industry. However, these 
studies function as a point of comparison when investigation the same phenomena in an 
unstudied industry.  
 
Recent research on the mobile handset industry has focused mostly on a few major 
research streams. Hess (2006), Li (2002), Maitland (2002) and Funk (2009) have 
analyzed the value chain structures of the mobile phone industry globally, in Europe 
and Japan, respectively. Rouvinen (2006) and Gao (2009) have looked at the industry 
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and its development from the perspective of developing countries while several authors 
including Xie & White (2006) and Lie et al (2009) have given special attention to the 
Chinese market. Another major research stream related to the handset market is that of 
subsidies. Several authors e.g. Kim et al. (2004) and Tallberg et al. (2007) have 
analyzed the effect of mobile phone subsidies on the industry and competition from 
different viewpoints. Obviously, a great number of other topics have been researched 
related to the mobile industry such as new product development by Koski & Kretschmer 
(2010) and industry ecosystems by Gueguen & Isckia (2010) and Basole (2009). 
 
Among the very few analytical articles with a focus on the handset market and 
manufacturers is that of Zhang & Prybutok (2005) “How the Mobile Communication 
Markets Differ in China, the U.S., and Europe”. This article makes an attempt to 
summarize the main macro level differences of the three markets including standards, 
price structures, regulation, demographics, usage patterns, business potential, and 
technology adoption. Still, despite being written by two professors in the field, this 
letter type magazine article is directed to a very broad audience and cites practically no 
academic studies. Another attempt to capture some attributes of the competition 
between companies is that of He et al. (2006) where they analyze the process by which 
Ericsson, Nokia and Samsung caught up with the once-leader Motorola technology-
wise.  
 
Thus, it appears that regional mobile phone markets, especially Europe and the United 
States, are practically untouched from the viewpoint of competition between companies. 
However, several non-academic books have been written (Hyöty, 2011; Steinbock, 
2010, Hakkarainen, 2010; Steinbock, 2003; Burnham, 2002) and numerous 
consultancies produce yearly or even quarterly analyses of the industry (Gartner, IDC, 
Strategy Analytics, Nordic Partners). Still, these publications are not intended as 
academic research and often normative in nature. 
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1.2. Research questions 
 
The primary aim of the thesis is to gain understanding of the characteristics of the 
European and the U.S. mobile phone markets from the viewpoint of competition. In 
order to gain additional insight into how these characteristics affect the companies, a 
special case focusing on Nokia in the United States will be investigated.  
 
The main research questions can be summarized as follows: 
1) What are the specific characteristics of the European and the U.S. mobile 
phone markets? 
2) In what respect are the two markets fundamentally different and why? 
3) Why has Nokia been unsuccessful in the U.S. market? 
 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 a literature review and the theoretical 
framework are presented. Chapter 3 reviews the structure of the mobile phone value 
system and the historical development and current state of the European and the U.S. 
mobile phone markets. Chapter 4 provides a discussion on the chosen methodology and 
case study procedure while Chapter 5 reviews case study findings. Chapter 6 concludes 
the thesis with theoretical and managerial implications, limitations and directions for 
future research. 
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2. Theoretical background 
 
This thesis utilizes two highly interrelated and well established fields of business 
research. Firstly, the main goal of the work is to analyze the competitive situation in the 
mobile phone industry in the European and U.S. markets. This aim will be approached 
by means of classical competition theories (Industrial Organization, IO) and relevant 
frameworks (Porter’s five forces) discussed in Section 2.1. Secondly, the thesis seeks to 
find explanations for Nokia’s unsatisfactory performance in the United States by means 
of case analysis. The applied case methodology is described in Chapter 4. 
 
2.1. Analytical framework 
 
As the main objective of this thesis is to analyze the European and the U.S. mobile 
phone markets, the selected framework supports this aim by approaching the markets on 
two different levels. Primarily, the analytical framework focuses on micro-environment 
i.e. looking at the markets from the viewpoints of the actors (suppliers, distributors, 
customers) and from that of competition. To analyze the contribution of each of these 
actors and other sources of competition, another well-established model, Porter´s five 
forces, will be utilized (Section 2.3). Where necessary, the observed phenomena are also 
interpreted from a wider, macro environmental perspective although more detailed 
analysis of macro-environmental factors will be omitted. The exclusion is justified by 
the fact that competition, even though influenced by the macro environment, takes place 
within the micro environment. In addition, concentrating on the micro-environment 
allows a broader and more in-depth treatment of the most relevant actors present in the 
micro-environment. 
 
On another dimension, the framework applies two different conceptual approaches, 
namely, international business (IB) environment and industrial organization (IO) 
economics. These approaches together serve to supplement the strongly 
microeconomics focused framework with suitable concepts grounded in the strongly 
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related IB and IO disciplines. While the industrial organization focuses on the 
company/market boundary from the perspective of imperfect competition, international 
business focuses on the qualities of international markets and companies operating 
across country boundaries. These approaches will be discussed in detail in Section 2.4.  
 
The analytical approach of the thesis is summarized in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Analytical framework of the study 
 
2.2. Macro-environment 
 
By definition, the macro-environment involves factors outside of the direct control of 
the business. These factors, then, include the economy, government policies, social 
changes etc. A firm may, for example, be influenced by new legislation or changes in 
taxation policies but the firm rarely has power to shape them itself. Thus, macro factors 
have the ability to fundamentally change the environment of an organization but the 
relationship is typically one way. (Gillespie, 2007) One of the most utilized frameworks 
to analyze the macro factors is the PESTEL analysis. 
 
The PESTEL framework stands for “Political, Economic, Social, Technological, 
Environmental and Legal” and is used for analyzing the macro-environment in which 
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Micro environment 
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Distributors 
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Competition 
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Industrial organization 
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companies operate and which also significantly affects each business independent of its 
size (Johnson et al., 2006:65) Similar acronyms such as ETPS, STEP, PEST, and 
STEEPLE are often used (CIPD, 2011) in each case including (or excluding) some 
factors and giving more weight to some in comparison to others. However, it always 
aims at capturing the essential of the macro-environment under a few broad categories 
to facilitate understanding and management of each factor within the business and to 
identify the key drivers of change (Johnson et al., 2006:69). 
 
Typical examples of the PESTEL factors are given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Components of the PESTEL analysis (Gillespie, 2007) 
Factor Issues 
Political EU enlargement, the euro, international trade, taxation policy 
Economic Interest rates, exchange rates, national income, inflation, unemployment, Stock 
Market 
Social Ageing population, attitudes to work, income distribution 
Technological Innovation, new product development, rate of technological obsolescence 
Environmental Global warming, environmental issues 
Legal Competition law, health and safety, employment law 
 
Even though the macro-environment will not be analyzed in detail in this thesis its 
influence in a company’s decision making processes is evident as well as its ability to 
change to conditions under which competition takes place. For example, the Finnish 
government’s decision to allow bundling of mobile phones had a direct impact on both 
handset manufacturers’ and mobile operators’ business. Thus, references to the macro-
environment and changes in it will be made alongside the analysis on companies and 
their micro-environment. 
 
2.3. Micro-environment 
 
The micro-environment can be defined as consisting of “stakeholder groups that a firm 
has regular dealings with” (Gillespie, 2007). For the purpose of this thesis, the focus 
will be on suppliers, distributors, customers and competition as illustrated in Figure 1 
following the concise definition of micro-environment by Gillespie (2007).  
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Suppliers 
In regard to its suppliers, any company generally needs to address questions such as 
“Can they provide the quality we require at a good price?”, “Can they adjust to changes 
in the supply volume?” and “What is out power relative to our suppliers and vice 
versa?” Increasingly, however, large multinational companies in particular are 
concerned about the ethicality of their suppliers’ operations. Recently, for example, 
Nokia was alleged to have used so called ‘blood metals’ in their mobile phones, to 
which Nokia responded by implementing yet more stringent systems to track the origin 
of its raw materials (Yle, 2010).  
 
Especially in the business of mobile phone manufacturing, suppliers and supply chain 
management (SCM) play a crucial role. Since mobile phones, smart phones in 
particular, contain numerous highly specialized components and modules, handset 
manufacturers generally acquire most of the components, software and even assembly 
from their suppliers and subcontractors (see the mobile phone value system in Figure 9). 
Nokia, for example, lists 35 countries as its main supplying locations and applies its so 
called Code of conduct to all its business partners. In the Code of conduct (Nokia, 
2011f) Nokia states that 
 
“…Nokia encourages its partners, subcontractors, or suppliers to strive beyond 
legal compliance in areas such as governance, human rights and the 
environment. Nokia incorporates ethical, social and environmental criteria in its 
procurement agreements and commits to monitoring the performance of its 
partners and to taking immediate and thorough remedial steps in cases where 
the ethical performance of its business partners comes into question.”- Nokia 
11.1.2011 (Nokia, 2011f) 
 
Thus, mobile phone manufacturers rely on suppliers to varying but generally great 
extent and can even be held responsible for choosing suppliers that use e.g. child labour 
or non-recyclable materials. To construct an iPhone, Apple, for example, sources its 
Retina display from LG, the A4 processor from Samsung, gyroscopes from 
STMicroelectronics, touch sensitive panels from Wintek and TPK, and chips from 
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Skyworks Solutions and TriQuint Semiconductor (AppleInsider, 2010). However, some 
conglomerates, e.g. Samsung manufacture most of the modules in-house which enables 
cutting down the number of suppliers and facilitates integration in the production 
process. Even if the recent business wisdom has advised companies to divest non-core 
functions and focus on a few core competencies, Samsung has proven that 
conglomerates may be highly profitable while retaining their non-core parts. Unlike 
Motorola, Samsung kept its component manufacturing in-house and focused on 
synergies from producing both components and end products. (Hyöty, 2011:250-252) 
 
Distributors 
The second essential element of a company's micro-environment is distributors. The 
choice of distribution channels is critical for a number of reasons. Firstly, the 
distributors strongly influence the final sales price of each product and thereby directly 
affect the sales quantity. Second, the distributors and later retailers play an important 
role in how the product is presented to the customer and, to some extent, how it is 
positioned relative to competing products. Finally, the choice of the distribution channel 
affects how customers perceive the brand. While Nokia, for example, utilizes a wide 
range of sales channels for its Nokia branded products, it sells its luxury phone brand 
Vertu (typically gold and diamond decorated, ranging from $6000 to $300 000) only in 
Vertu and Nokia flagship stores (Vertu, 2011; Dialaphone, 2007) 
 
In the mobile handset business, the distribution channel plays a crucial role. While in 
Europe most mobile phone manufacturers rely on a large number of individual 
distributors and retailers, in North America the bulk of handset sales is carried out by 
mobile network and virtual operators (see Figure 22). The long-lasting dominance of 
mobile operators over distribution in the United States has allowed them to introduce 
additional requirements related to e.g. tailoring and branding of phones, and together 
with subsidies a commanding position in the industry. Still, the choices related to 
distribution come down to the same basic questions, i.e. what are the total costs, how is 
the brand communicated, how flexible is the distributor etc.  
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Customers 
The third element of the company's micro-environment is customers. In this respect, it is 
common to separate between individual consumers and organizational (or industrial) 
customers (or buyers). While consumers are traditionally considered less rational and 
impulsive in their decision making process, companies tend to be viewed as 
professional buyers following strict budget, cost and profit considerations. (see e.g. 
Webster & Wind, 1972; Baumgartner & Steenkamp, 1996) These kind of clear 
differences in purchasing behaviour have been questioned (Wilson, 2000) and today’s 
B-to-B marketers widely recognize that emotions play an important role also in business 
buying decisions (Kotler & Armstrong, 2006:178). 
 
In the mobile phone business, consumers represent an enormous variety of tastes, 
preferences and affluence. In developing countries, the sales of low-end mobile phones 
(often under $50) dominate, while in developed markets of e.g. Europe and North 
America, consumers often opt for more advanced models incorporating cameras, GPS 
navigation, Internet browsing etc. Moreover, most of these consumers appreciate value 
added features and post-purchase services provided by the manufacturer (e.g. Apple 
App Store, Nokia Ovi Store and Google Android Market) and often base their purchase 
decision on the combination of the phone and the availability of these services (see e.g. 
Singh & Goyal, 2009). Industrial buyers, on the other hand, tend to value services 
related business use of the phone (e-mail, data security etc.) and supplier's ability to 
provide a communications solution to the company instead of only handsets. 
 
Finally, with regard to the mobile phone industry in Europe and the United States, there 
are some significant differences in customer profiles. While in Europe a handset 
manufacturer can sell both directly to the consumer and via distributors and retailers, in 
the United States the only major customer is the operator that, then, functions as a 
distributor and retailer. This, obviously, has its effect on what kind of marketing is 
needed to reach the end customer. 
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Competition 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines competition as "the effort of two or more 
parties acting independently to secure the business of a third party by offering the most 
favourable terms". (Merriam Webster Online, 2011) Correspondingly, The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics states that "competition arises whenever two or more 
parties strive for something that all cannot obtain." (Stigler, 2008) In this thesis, these 
competing "parties" are handset manufacturers who act to "secure the business" or 
"strive for" the limited resource, i.e. the money, of their customers.  
 
In terms of developed economic theory, competition is one of the most researched areas 
of economics. Economists generally differentiate perfect and imperfect competition, 
concluding that no other system is more Pareto efficient than perfect competition. 
According to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 1999) 
perfect competition is defined by four conditions: 
a) There are such a large number of buyers and sellers that none can individually 
affect the market price.  This means that the demand curve facing an individual 
firm is perfectly elastic.   
b) In the long run, resources must be freely mobile, meaning that there are no 
barriers to entry and exit. 
c) All market participants (buyers and sellers) must have full access to the 
knowledge relevant to their production and consumption decisions. 
 d) The products should be homogenous.  
 
Imperfect competition, thus, occurs when any of the criteria for perfect competition is 
not satisfied, e.g. when there is information asymmetry between buyers and sellers, 
either buyers or sellers are able to influence prices or products are not homogenous. 
 
In regard to the mobile phone industry, there is a clear case of imperfect competition. 
Firstly, the three largest manufacturers Nokia, Samsung and LG held about 64 % of the 
global unit sales in Q1/2010 while the tenth largest Huawei had 1,3 %. (Gartner, 2010) 
This kind of a market situation is generally referred to as an oligopoly “in which 
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producers are so few that the actions of each of them have an impact on price and on 
competitors” (Merriam Webster Online, 2011). Second, there are fairly high barriers to 
entry due to the capital intensive nature of the business. In addition, gaining market 
share generally requires significant investments in marketing and established 
manufacturers can benefit from advantages of scale. 
 
The third criteria dealing with information symmetry and completeness might not far 
from what is required for perfect competition. The mobile phone industry is well 
covered in media and each major product launch is quickly followed by technical 
analyses of the products and comparisons to the other products on the market. On the 
manufacturer side, due to the mere size of the companies, they can be considered to, at 
least, have resources to produce the information they need to make justified production 
decisions. Yet, it should be noted that critical views exist as to the media's ability to 
provide the consumers with unbalanced and reliable information on the handset market 
(see e.g. Ahonen 2010; Wilcox 2010)  
 
Finally, the last criterion related to the homogeneity of products can easily be rejected in 
the handset market. The companies have highly differentiated products in terms of 
design, capabilities, operating system, brand qualities etc. This is especially true for 
high end phones such as Apple iPhone, Samsung Galaxy S or Nokia N8. However, in 
more standard feature phones, the existence of close substitutes could be justified and 
the competition in this area closer to perfect. This claim finds ground in the significantly 
smaller profit margins available to the producer (see e.g. Elmer-DeWitt, 2010). 
 
Even though the competition in the handset industry is imperfect, it is still fierce and 
highly dynamic. For the purpose of this thesis, and to gain an insight into the 
components of competition, the Porter's Five Forces –model will be applied (Figure 2).  
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According to Porter (1979:137) the Five Forces -model presents the five forces which 
together determine the competitive intensity of a company's micro-environment (or 
industry). A highly unattractive industry would be one where all the five forces are 
strongly present, presenting similarities to perfect competition. The model draws upon 
Industrial Organization (IO) economics which will be briefly reviewed in Section 2.4. A 
five forces analysis of the mobile phone markets of the United States and Europe is 
carried out in Section 3.2. 
 
The Porter’s five forces model has been criticized, for example, for its underlying 
assumptions. Firstly, an industry is assumed to consist of an unrelated set of buyers, 
sellers and substitutes and competitors that interact at arm’s length. Second, companies 
can gather wealth that allows them to erect barriers against existing competition and 
new entrants thereby creating structural advantage. Finally, the prevailing uncertainty is 
assumed low enough to permit predictions about the participants’ behavior and choose a 
strategy accordingly. (Coyne & Subramaniam, 1996:30-31). In addition, one should 
also note that the model was developed more than 30 years and, since then, new 
industries have been born and the old ones taken new shapes. Sheenan (2005: 53-60) 
argues that the classical model such as the Five Forces and value chain analysis were 
Threat of  
New Entrants 
Bargaining Power 
of Suppliers 
Threat of Substitute 
Products or Services 
Bargaining Power 
of Suppliers 
Rivalry 
Among 
Existing 
Competitor
Figure 2. Porter's Five Forces -model (Porter, 1979:141) 
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designed for the analysis of traditional industrial firms and do not apply well to today’s 
knowledge-intensive companies. 
 
The rationale for choosing the Five Forces framework was as follows. The model was to 
be well-known and tested. Even though Porter’s model has been criticized for its 
applicability to certain industries and for its assumptions, few models have gone 
through such thorough testing and prevailed. While no model is perfect the limitations 
of the Porter’s framework are, nevertheless, well-known and documented. Finally, the 
use a widely accepted framework facilitates reading and interpretation of the results as 
opposed to some other model with less prevalence and academic/practitioner interest. 
 
2.4 Conceptual approaches 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the thesis framework is founded on two conceptual 
approaches, namely international business and industrial organization economics. In this 
section, a brief overview of the approaches and their applications in the mobile phone 
industry will be given. 
Industrial organization economics 
According to Cabral (2000:3) IO economics is a discipline that is concerned with "the 
workings of markets and industries, in particular the way firms compete with each 
other". Moreover, he notes that whereas microeconomics focuses on the extreme cases 
of monopolies and perfect competition, IO is "concerned primarily with the 
intermediate case of oligopoly, that is, competition between a few firms" and could be 
defined as "economics of imperfect competition". These definitions well apply to the 
case of mobile phone industry where a few large companies compete in the market both 
in Europe and the United States, and where products are partial substitutes but also 
significantly differentiated. 
 
The IO economics supplements the model of perfect competition by including 
imperfections related to entry barriers, asymmetric information, transaction costs etc. 
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which together inevitably lead to imperfect competition. Moreover IO studies how 
firms, under these conditions, are organized and how they compete. (Cabral, 2000) 
Regarding these competitive actions, the research in IO has focused, for instance, on 
product differentiation (Shaked & Sutton, 1982), game theory (Bagwell & Wolinsky, 
2002), oligopolies (Stigler, 1964; Fershtman & Judd, 1987) and pricing strategies 
(Diamond, 1971). It should be noted that IO is also a highly dispersed discipline 
presenting different views and schools of thought (see e.g. Conner, 1991). 
 
A central paradigm in IO economics is based on the structure conduct performance 
(SCP) hypothesis (Bain, 1968; Mason, 1939) whose main idea was that “industry 
structure determined the behaviour or conduct of firms, whose joint conduct then 
determined the collective performance of the firms in the marketplace.” (Porter, 1981) 
Within the traditional IO paradigm performance encompassed dimensions such as 
technical efficiency (cost minimization), allocative efficiency (profitability) and 
innovativeness while conduct entailed company’s decisions on variables such as price, 
advertising, and quality. Finally, structure was considered a fairly stable set of economic 
and technical variables under which competition occurred. (Bain, 1972)  
 
The IO theory is considered limited in some respects (see e.g. Porter, 1981) and some 
studies question the applicability of the SCP model to certain industries (e.g. Evanoff & 
Fortier, 1988). In some cases a given structure may not result in theoretically anticipated 
conduct and performance. For instance, intense rivalry in an oligopolistic market may 
result in conduct and performance similar to what is considered a property of the 
perfectly competitive model. Secondly scale economies occasionally available to 
oligopolies may lead to better economic efficiency under perfect competition. Finally, 
IO research has traditionally mostly focused on structure and performance paying 
considerable less attention to conduct due to data and measurement problems. 
(Scarborough & Kydd, 1992; French, 1977)  
 
Despite the criticism, there are a great number of studies where the IO and the related 
SCP frameworks continue to be applied (see e.g. Kang, 2009; Luan & Browne, 2008). 
In regard to the mobile handset industry, both IO theory and the related SCP paradigm 
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can be used to explain, for instance, the structure of the industry, characteristics of 
(imperfect) competition and competitive actions taken by companies. Further analysis 
of the competitive situation within the industry will be carried out specifically in 
chapters 3 and 5. 
International business 
As the thesis aims at capturing the essential qualities of an extremely international (or 
global) market of mobile phones, the holistic framework presented in Figure 1 is 
complemented by the concepts, models and theories offered by the International 
Business (IB) discipline. While the micro- and macro-environmental frameworks offer 
two levels of analysis and IO tools for analyzing imperfect competition, the IB provides 
the methodology related to companies, multinationals in particular, operating in 
international markets having highly varying characteristics. 
 
History 
 
International business could be defined as the “study of transactions taking place across 
national borders for the purpose of satisfying the needs of individuals and 
organizations”. (Rugman & Collinson, 2009) The history of international business as an 
academic discipline dates back to the post World War II era in the 1950s, when most 
international operations were carried out by companies’ international divisions and true 
MNEs were few. At that time the research emphasis was still very general and 
interdisciplinary while most professors had backgrounds in economics or general 
business. (Rugman & Collinson, 2009; Shenkar, 2004) 
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the study of international business saw a substantial 
change. The economic growth of Europe and Japan led to increasing interest in 
international business operations throughout the developed world. Simultaneously, IB 
as an academic field gained momentum and an increasing number of scientific articles 
were written. The era was still dominated by studies in very specific areas and a demand 
existed for a broader, strategic focus. (Rugman & Collinson, 2009; Shenkar, 2004) 
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In the 1990s, international business began to adopt concepts from the closely related 
strategic management discipline bringing the dispersed field together. The previous 
interdisciplinary and functional approaches were now being supplemented by a 
multidisciplinary approach incorporating and drawing information from a variety of 
related disciplines (finance, economics etc.) which all affected international business. 
This development since 1950s is summarized in Table 2. (Rugman & Collinson, 2009) 
 
Table 2. Comparative differences in the study of international business 1950-2010 (adapted from 
Rugman & Collinson, 2009). LDC = Least Developed Country, NIC = Newly Industrialized 
Country 
Topic 1950-1969 1970-1989 1990-2010 
Focus of interest General information Functional areas of 
development 
Strategic emphasis 
Approach to 
studying IB 
Descriptive Analytical Integrative 
Method of 
explanation 
Heavily historical Functional Multidisciplinary 
Research 
emphasis 
Interdisciplinary More quantitative research 
methods and overseas travel 
Quantitative research methods, 
overseas travel, and 
international assignments 
Enterprise 
viewpoint 
US enterprises MNEs Networks 
Countries 
examined 
Industrialized Industrialized, NICs, and LDCs Industrialized, NICs, and LDCs 
Journal emphasis General international 
topics 
Functional Functional and strategic 
 
 
Thus, historically, a significant body of IB literature has focused on areas such as 
globalization, national competitiveness (e.g. Porter, 1990), foreign direct investment 
(FDI), cultures (Hofstede, 2001), economics of international trade, international 
financial markets etc. However, since the focus of this thesis is on a single industry and 
more specifically on the situation of a single company within that industry, most focus 
will be directed on MNE strategies and industry level analysis. The analysis, then, 
extends over several key areas of international business, a brief review of which will be 
presented in what follows. 
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International business operation modes 
 
Foreign operation modes (or methods) deal with how a company organizes its 
operations in a foreign location. In principle, foreign operation modes can be divided 
into contractual modes, exporting and investment modes as illustrated in Figure 3 
(Welch 2007:4). 
 
 
 
It should be noted that alternative categorizations of the operation modes exist (see e.g. 
Luostarinen, 1989; Root, 1994). However, in what follows, the classification in Figure 3 
shall be followed due to its capability to summarize the basic options available for an 
MNC. 
 
The choice of the operation mode(s) is critical for any company since it greatly 
influences the way the company can perform international operations in its selected 
location. While choosing, for example, indirect exporting obviously limits risk and 
requires less capital, it cannot match the control and presence in the foreign market 
offered by most investment modes (100% owned at the extreme). Obviously, the bigger 
the company the more resources it can allocate and the more freely it can choose its 
operation mode. MNEs generally operate using a combination of various operation 
modes. An attempt to summarize the fairly complex operation mode decision has been 
given by Welch (2007:442) in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 3. Major foreign operation method options (Welch et al. 2007:4) 
Contractual Modes Exporting Investment Modes 
• Franchising 
• Licensing 
• Management contracts 
• Subcontracting 
• Project operations 
• Alliances 
• Indirect 
• Direct: agent/distributor 
• Own sales office/ 
subsidiary 
• Minority share (alliance) 
• 50/50 
• Majority share 
• 100% owned 
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In the mobile phone industry, major companies operate using an extensive set of 
different operation modes. Nokia, for instance, has factories, R&D and sales offices all 
around the world. The factories are mostly concentrated in low-cost countries (e.g. 
China, India and Hungary), while most R&D is carried out in countries with advanced 
research and R&D infrastructure such as the United States, Switzerland, Germany and 
Finland. (NRC 2011) It should be noted, however, that in 2001 Nokia established a 
research institute in Brazil (iNdT, 2011) and in 2005 already its sixth R&D unit in 
China. (Physorg, 2005) On top of these investment mode operations, Nokia utilizes 
subcontracting of chipsets, project operations when building mobile phone networks 
(under NSN), alliances e.g. with Microsoft and Siemens, own sales offices (Nokia 
stores) etc. 
 
Mode determination 
process: negotiation 
(price etc.); cross-
cultural interaction; 
foreign market visits; 
language issues; 
information 
gathering and new 
inputs 
Entering or 
expanding 
company’s 
interests 
Target 
company’s 
interests (JV, 
intermediary, 
licensee 
Foreign 
market 
conditions, 
demands: e.g. 
government 
Stimulus, 
interest in, 
action 
towards, 
method use 
Final 
method 
choice 
Figure 4. Foreign operation method choice (Welch 2007:442) 
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Globalization impact and firm response strategies 
 
(Economic) globalization could be defined as the “integration of national economies 
into the international economy through trade, direct foreign investment (by corporations 
and multinationals), short-term capital flows, international flows of workers and 
humanity generally, and flows of technology” (Bhagwati, 2004).  Although 
globalization could be viewed from a wider viewpoint referring to e.g. cultural 
globalization or even homogenization of tastes and people, for the purpose of this thesis 
only the economic interpretation (above) is considered. 
 
In regard to the mobile handset industry, the impact of globalization has been very 
significant and, today, the mobile phone market can be considered truly global 
(although not homogeneous). Most of the large companies (Nokia, Samsung, LG etc.) 
are present in all continents and competing on the whole price range. The existence of a 
global market can be traced back to the absence of significant barriers of international 
business and the significant economic gains (scale and scope) that can be achieved from 
selling larger quantities. Still, the markets are not homogenous due to different income 
levels, tastes, adapted technologies and business models.  
 
For an individual company, globalization means new markets and opportunities for 
growth beyond those available in the home market. However, these opportunities are 
available for all the companies that operate globally and, generally, companies do not 
anymore enjoy protection or preferred status in their home markets. However, 
internationality is in the very nature of mobile phone business and the company that can 
organize its operations most effectively across national borders can gain substantially. 
 
 
International brand management 
 
While brand could be defined as the “identity of a specific product, service or business” 
(Birkin 1994), brand identity constitutes “a set of attributes designed to distinguish a 
particular firm, product, or line, with the intention of promoting awareness and loyalty 
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on the part of consumers” (Oxford Dictionary, 2011). In the context of international 
business, international brand management would thus refer to the management of these 
attributes (slogan, product names, features, pricing, distribution etc.) of a brand or 
several brands when operating in international markets. 
 
In an international setting, there are a significant number of variables that affect 
branding such as language and cultural differences, consumption patterns and legal and 
regulatory environments. (Rugman & Collinson, 2009) For example, Coca-Cola has 
made small adjustments (bottle size, labels etc.) to its main product, but also issued 
complementary brands such as Spritea, a tea-flavored drink that is a combination of 
Sprite and tea. (China Daily, 2011) In addition, to manage an international brand the 
company needs to assure that in each location the consumers perceive the brand in a 
desired way. McDonald’s, for its part, designs its product offering individually for each 
country serving McRuis (of rye bread) in Finland and only Halal meat products in 
Egypt. (McDonald’s Egypt, 2011)  
 
In the mobile phone business, most large companies have opted for a single brand 
strategy. For example, Nokia operates globally under a single brand Nokia (although the 
niche high-end brand Vertu does exist (Vertu 2011)) and the unique “Connecting 
people” –slogan. However, it should be noted that Nokia differentiates and positions its 
products also on product line basis by having X-, N-, E- and C-series for mid- and high-
end phones and numbered series (e.g. Nokia 2700 Classic) mostly for feature phones. In 
addition, Nokia has introduced additional brands such as N-Gage for gaming and 
cooperated in branding with e.g. Carl Zeiss in camera optics and Dolby in audio. 
(Nokia, 2011) 
 
Finally, there are great many variables in the business environment that a company 
cannot control. For instance, the operator dominated environment of the United States 
has a significant impact on branding while most operators demand their brands to be 
visible on the phones.  
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International channel strategies 
 
Once the firm has chosen an appropriate market entry mode for its foreign markets, it 
needs to decide how to organize distribution of its products within those markets. The 
channel decisions and the most important external determinants are summarized in 
Figure 5.  
 
 
Major decision Subdecisions 
Decisions concerning structure of the 
channel 
• Types of intermediary (alternative distribution channels) 
• Coverage (intensive, selective or exclusive) 
• Length (number of levels) 
• Control resources  
• Degree of integration 
Managing and controlling distribution 
channels 
• Screening and selecting intermediaries 
• Contracting (distributor agreement) 
• Motivating 
• Controlling 
• Termination 
Managing logistics Physical movement of goods through the channel systems 
• Order handling 
• Transportation 
• Inventory 
• Storage/warehousing 
Figure 5. Channel decisions (adapted from Hollensen, 2007:507) 
 
In the mobile phone business, channel strategies vary significantly both between 
companies and geographical locations. Apple, for example, is known to be very 
selective as to who is allowed to represent its products and carries out a large share of 
its sales through its own stores. Nokia, on the other, has pursued a less selective strategy 
distributing its products through various retailers, internet stores, operators etc. 
However, the sales of its luxury brand Vertu are organized through Nokia flagship 
stores only. Comparable phenomena were taking place in the mid-1990s when PC 
companies Dell and Gateway started cutting middlemen and distributing directly to the 
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end customer. The direct model allowed them, for example, to eliminate two layers of 
inventory and have control over pricing and branding (Dedrick & Kraemer, 2007:4). 
The indirect and direct distribution channels in the PC industry are illustrated in Figure 
6. 
 
 
 
 
In some cases, the competitive landscape of a market strongly influences the available 
channel options. This is the case for example in the United States, where most of the 
sales are carried out through mobile operators and selling via other channels has proven 
to be difficult (see Sections 3.3-3.4). In Europe alternative channels are generally 
available since operators possess less power on the market. To cite an example of the 
distribution channel options available to a handset manufacturer, those of Nokia in 
China are given in Figure 7. The example focuses on China as similar research, at the 
time of writing, could not be found related to the European or U.S. markets.  
 
Component 
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CM/ODM PC maker Distributor Retailer/ 
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Distribution Sales 
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Component 
suppliers 
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R&D 
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Manufacturing Design, final assembly, 
marketing, sales, service 
 
Figure 6. Indirect and direct distribution in the PC industry (Dedrick & Kraemer, 2007:5) 
CM = Contract Manufacturer, ODM = Original Design Manufacturer 
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Figure 7. Nokia's distribution channels in China (Duan 2007:82) 
 
As seen in Figure 7, Nokia utilizes a wide range of distributors and retailers on several 
levels to reach the end consumer. Obviously, by eliminating all the middle men, Nokia 
could reduce costs and gain control over distribution, but there are critical differences 
what comes to the two markets. Since mobile phones do not function without a 
connection to the network (that is provided by the network operator) a handset 
manufacturer will not be able to sell phones to consumers unless the consumers can 
freely choose the mobile operator. Even if this were technically possible, the pricing 
models applied by the U.S. operators typically make this financially unattractive to the 
consumer.  
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3. Market Description 
 
While the European and U.S. mobile markets developed early and the demand on these 
markets is largely focused on high-end devices, applications etc. the fast economic 
growth and development of Asian countries has undeniably shifted the economic power 
to the East. As seen Figure 8, the Asia-Pacific region already in 2009 constituted a 
staggering 52,2 percent of the global sales volume, while Europe currently has around 
27 %, the United States 11 % and the rest of the world a mere 7 %. (Datamonitor, 
2010b:12) Taking into account the rapid growth rate of the Asia-Pacific economies it 
would seem probable that their dominance will only grow stronger. 
Asia-Pacific
Europe
United States
Rest of the world
 
Figure 8. Global mobile phones market value by region in 2009 (Datamonitor 2010b:12) 
 
In this chapter, a more detailed general description of the European (Section 3.3) and 
U.S. (Section 3.4) mobile phone markets is given. The discussion on the individual 
markets is preceded by a general description of the qualities of a generalized mobile 
handset market in Section 3.1 and a five forces analysis in Section 3.2. Finally, the 
chapter concludes with a brief comparison of the European and U.S. markets. 
 
3.1. Description of the mobile phone market 
 
A mobile phone market consists of several strongly interlinked entities. Even though the 
prevalence and significance of each party varies in each market (European, U.S. etc.), 
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there yet exists a fairly consistent set of actors. This so called mobile phone value 
system is illustrated in Figure 9. 
 
 
 
 
Generally, a mobile handset manufacturer operates in close cooperation with several 
network parties. In the manufacturing stage, the handset manufacturer requires inputs 
from component and equipment providers (e.g. Perlos) should the manufacturer take 
charge of the manufacturing process itself. Apple, for instance, orders its displays from 
LG and processors from Samsung (Appleinsider, 2010) while Samsung produces most 
components for its handsets in-house. However, the production may also be partly or 
completely outsourced to a contract manufacturer such as Elcoteq or Flextronics. On 
the other hand, a manufacturer such as Nokia needs to actively cooperate with mobile 
infrastructure manufacturers (e.g. Ericsson, Nokia Siemens Networks) and Mobile 
(network) operators such as Teliasonera to guarantee their support and facilitate sales 
through the mobile operator in addition to the apparent sales channel established by 
dealers like Gigantti. In addition, there exist great many suppliers of content and 
 
Users 
 
Dealers  
Mobile Network 
Operators (MNOs) 
 
Content Providers 
Mobile Application 
Providers 
Specialized Services 
Banking, Accounting, Legal 
Specialized Risk Capital 
 
Mobile 
Infrastructure 
Manufacturers 
 
Mobile Handset 
Manufacturers 
 
Standard-Setting Organizations 
 
Educational Institutions 
 
Contract Manufacturers 
Component and 
equipment providers 
Figure 9.The Mobile Phone Value System (adapted from Porter & Solvell, 2002) 
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applications as well as financing and advisory services that are crucial for the handset 
manufacturer. 
 
In addition to the above mentioned and rather evident actors, it should be noted that in 
the mobile industry the role of standard-setting organizations such as 3rd Generation 
Partnership Project (3GPP) and International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is of 
great importance. This is due to the fact that standards are co-developed among industry 
leaders (Nokia, NSN, Ericsson, Huawei, Motorola etc.) and the companies that manage 
to include their Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) into the final standards such as 3GPP 
Release 99 (i.e. the base case standard for 3G devices and networks) have a significant 
advantage over other manufacturers due to license payments (e.g. the dispute between 
Nokia and Qualcomm over IPRs, see Hughlett, 2006). The importance of essential 
patents and the relative contributions of the participating companies have been 
discussed by He et al. (2006). 
 
3.2 Five forces analysis 
 
Since the European and the U.S. markets present a great number of similarities, the five 
forces analysis will be carried out jointly for both markets with additional remarks 
related to each individual market. Driving upon Industrial Organization (IO) economics, 
the five forces framework is used to evaluate the competitive conditions and the 
resulting attractiveness of a given industry. For a more detailed description of the 
method refer to Section 2.3. 
 
Buyer power 
 
In the mobile phone market, the buyer power dimension consists of components such as 
buyer size, buyer switching costs vs. firm switching costs, availability of existing 
substitute products, dependency on existing distribution channels etc. From the 
viewpoint of a handset manufacturer, there are several buyer types e.g. consumers, 
retailers, mobile operators and businesses. While in Europe the end consumers can be 
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reached directly and via different middlemen, in the United States the operators handle 
around 90 % of end sales and thereby control the distribution. (Rauhala, 2010; 
Steinbock, 2010) Thus, the U.S. buyers (i.e. operators) generally have far greater power 
than their European counterparts. Still, the consumers’ brand and product preferences 
obviously greatly affect what mobile operators choose to offer and thereby also exercise 
power over mobile operators. 
 
The power possessed by different buyer groups also comes from different sources. In 
addition to consumers’ capability to influence mobile operators, their power also stems 
from their facility and tendency to switch the brand whenever they see necessary while 
the operators are generally tied to longer-term contractual obligations towards the 
manufacturers. The distributors and retailers, depending on their size, then represent a 
middle case where they have some contractual obligations and generally buy substantial 
volumes. 
 
Supplier power 
 
The supplier power stems from supplier switching costs, degree of input adaption, 
strength of the distribution channel, scarcity of suitable suppliers, ability of suppliers to 
vertically integrate, importance of quality/cost etc. In the mobile phone industry, with 
respect to other actors, suppliers generally possess mediocre market power (see e.g. 
Datamonitor, 2010a; Datamonitor, 2010b) although in some cases companies such 
Nokia have been accused of dominating their suppliers who have had no choice but to 
obey and adapt (Alkio & Lilius, 2009). This dominance results, among other things, 
from the handset manufacturers’ agility in tendering and switching suppliers. However, 
it should be noted that the emergence of large MNCs such as Samsung as suppliers and 
the increasing complexity of the supplied components serve to increase supplier power.  
 
In Europe and the United States there does not seem to be any obvious difference while 
the supplying is global and, especially, not focused neither in the United Stated nor 
Europe. Finally, one should note that the dependence of a company on each of its 
suppliers varies to a great extent. For instance, if a mobile phone manufacturer designs 
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its hardware to match the operating system supplied by a specific supplier (say HTC for 
Google Android), switching the supplier would constitute a significant cost and might 
lead to supplier’s dominance. 
 
New entrants 
 
The situation in the mobile phone industry with respect to ‘new entrants’ is currently 
two-fold. On one hand, mobile phones have reached such complexity that any company 
planning on entering should generally have vast financial, technological and marketing 
resources. On the other hand, the homogenization of hardware especially in the low-end 
and the increasing software focus allow an easier entry for companies traditionally 
strong in software R&D such as Google. Nevertheless, the capital intensity of the 
industry still constitutes a significant barrier of entry and the dimension ranks average 
both in Europe and the United States (see e.g. Datamonitor, 2010a; Datamonitor, 
2010b). 
 
Recently, the fast economic growth, development and internationalization the 
economies of certain Asian countries, South Korea, Taiwan and China in particular, 
have encouraged companies from these markets to enter the European and the U.S. 
markets in search of further growth. The entry of companies such as HTC (Taiwan) and 
ZTE (China) has increased competition especially in the low and mid-range (Schwartz, 
2009, Medford, 2008). However, this recent increase in the number of actors in the 
European and the U.S. markets also makes the market less attractive for new entrants in 
the future. 
 
Degree of rivalry 
 
The degree of rivalry also includes a great number of factors: competitor size, number 
of players, level of differentiation, low-cost switching, similarity of companies etc. The 
mobile phone industry is dynamic by nature with short product life cycles and changing 
consumer tastes. Both in Europe and the United States there are numerous large 
manufacturers present in the industry is and the competition in all categories fierce 
 31 
(Mustonen, 2010). Even if none of the manufacturers is able to dominate any single 
market, they have the power to influence prices and their actions affect other actors. 
During recent years the transformation of the industry towards software focus has also 
attracted new companies and added to the rivalry (Landler, 2007). 
 
The rivalry originates from different sources in different categories. In the low and mid-
range the products are feature-wise fairly similar and numerous, and the competition has 
a strong price focus. In the high-end some companies, Apple in particular, have 
managed to differentiate their offering and reap clearly higher than average profits. 
(Frommer, 2009) In general, the degree of rivalry could be considered to rank highest 
among the five forces especially now that several Asian companies are entering the 
market and traditional players are fighting at the cost of profitability over their market 
shares (Herrala, 2009).  
 
Threat of substitutes 
 
Currently there would appear to be no obvious substitute for mobile phones in people’s 
everyday lives. Rather, it seems that mobile phones are absorbing many of the functions 
of the other electronic devices such as camera, calculator, MP3 player etc. The closest 
substitutes would traditionally be fixed line telephony which obviously lacks mobility to 
really be considered substitute and a laptop computer, which can be considered more of 
a complementary product (also finds support in the secondary data on the US market in 
Chapter 5). However, it should be noted that many of the manufacturers of 
complementary products may actually notice an opportunity to become mobile phone 
producers mostly utilizing their existing knowledge and expertise in electronics (take 
LG and Samsung for example). Thus, in the case of mobile phone industry, threat of 
substitutes would not constitute a major factor in the five forces framework (see also 
Datamonitor, 2010a; Datamonitor, 2010b).  
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3.3. Europe 
 
According to Datamonitor (2010a) mobile phones industry profile the European mobile 
phone market shrank by 2,6 % to a value of $25,7 billion in 2009. In the same year, the 
total unit sales reached a volume of 260,8 million units corresponding to a per-unit price 
of $95,6. The historical value and growth of the market is illustrated in Figure 10. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. European Mobile Phone Market Value (adapted from Datamonitor, 2010a:10) 
 
Looking at the distribution of the market value in Europe (Figure 11) it can be seen that 
the three largest countries by mobile phones sales volume account for around 53 percent 
of the total market value. The five biggest, Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom 
and Spain already total approximately 73 percent. Thus, the European mobile phone 
market is strongly driven by a few developed and populous countries while the 
contribution of most European countries (50 in total) is fairly small.  
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Figure 11. Market volume by country in Europe (Datamonitor 2010a:12) 
 
Nevertheless, one should note that the purchasing power varies notably across Europe 
and influences the prices of phones bought in each country. The three biggest countries 
by sales constitute 28,4 % and the five biggest 43,4 % of the population of Europe. 
Comparing these population figures to the respective shares of market volume it is 
evident that people in these five high GDP countries, where GPD (PPP) in 2010 ranges 
from $29 400 (Spain) to $35 700 (Germany), spend more on average on mobile phones 
than in the rest of Europe which accounts for 56,6 % of the total population but only 
26,8 % of market volume. (CIA 2011, IMF 2011) 
 
While the market value in dollars gives us relevant information of the growth or decline 
of a market, it does not reveal the composition of this value. In order to gain insight into 
the type and category of handsets that consumers buy each given year, it is useful to 
look at the average selling price of a mobile phone. The number of units sold each year 
and the average unit price are given in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12. Number of units sold (millions) and unit price ($) in Europe (Datamonitor, 2010a:11) 
 
As evident from Figure 12, despite the growth in the number of units sold (210 million 
to 260 million over 5 years) the total sales volume has not risen correspondingly due to 
a decline in the average price of a unit during 2005-2007. This can be interpreted in 
several ways. First, increasing price competition might have forced vendors to reduce 
their retail prices in order to retain market share. This claim finds support in an article 
published in the Finnish magazine Tietoviikko (2010) stating that the average price of a 
Nokia mobile phone went down from 64 euros to 61 euros from Q2/2009 to Q2/2010 
and that of smart phones from 181 to 143 euros. Similarly, South Korean LG saw a 
decline of 27,8 % in the average selling price (ASP) during the same period. 
(Lenninghan, 2010) 
 
Another reason that may explain the evident reduction in the average cell phone prices 
is the increasing sales in developing countries, mostly in Asia and Africa. These 
handsets mostly represent the low-end of manufacturers’ product assortment and 
thereby lower the average price. Thirdly, mid priced handsets are starting to offer many 
of the functionalities traditionally available in high-end devices and can therefore meet 
the demands of the average consumer. However, this trend reversed in 2007-2008 and 
since then the sales volume has seen a small decline but the average price has gone up 
by close to 10 per cent. 
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Market shares 
The development of market shares of individual companies in the European market has 
been presented in Figure 13. Despite the heated debate over and discussion on the 
performance of individual companies (especially Nokia and Apple) over the last few 
years, the changes in their relative positions have not been very dramatic. Perhaps the 
clearest individual trend has been the rise of Samsung to clearly occupy the 2nd position 
on the market still about 8 percentage units behind Nokia. The following four biggest 
handset manufacturers all account for individual market shares of 5-10 %, i.e. already 
trailing around 20 percentage units behind Samsung and 25-30 percentage units behind 
Nokia. 
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Figure 13. Handset manufacturer market shares 2005-2010 in European market. 
* Based on Q1 sales. ** Based on Q1+Q2 sales. (IDC 2006, 2008, 2010) 
 
There is, however, a reason why the debate especially over the so called flagship models 
and their relative competitiveness could be justified. A well accepted argument has been 
presented that many of the customers on the market base their purchasing decisions on 
how advanced they consider the manufacturer to be even if their intention is not to 
acquire the flagship model (or even a smart phone). Some might argue, that the relative 
decline of Nokia from 2007 to 2010 could be explained by the absence of a comparable 
flagship model to that of Apple (i.e. iPhone) even though the flagship model itself 
contributes a fairly small portion of the total sales. For example, Nokia’s flagship model 
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N8 was estimated to account for around 3,2 % of Nokia’s total sales in Q4/2010 (Nokia, 
2010d; Rautanen, 2010).  
 
What follows, is an analysis of the development of the sales and market share of Nokia 
during the period of 2005-2009. Prior to 2005 Nokia’s sales in Europe were included in 
a compound figure consisting of Europe, Middle East and Africa and are therefore not 
comparable. The whole statistics of Nokia’s sales as reported by the company are given 
in the 20-F filing. Notice that the market shares of Nokia in Figure 13 and Figure 14 and 
not fully comparable as Figure 14 uses year end values while Figure 13 bases on a 
combination of Q1, Q1/Q2 and full year average market shares. In addition, Figure 13 
utilizes IDC estimates while Figure 14 those given by Nokia. This decision is justified 
by the intention to maintain comparability within a graph (between companies in Figure 
13 and Europe-global in Figure 14) and the lack of availability of full year data for all 
the companies. 
 
In Figure 14, we notice that during the period of 2005 – 2009 Nokia has been able to 
steadily increase its market share in Europe from around 37 % to 42 % excluding a 
small temporary notch in 2006. Globally, the company has maintained its market share 
in the range of 34 – 36 % during the 5 year period. The most recent reports about the 
development during 2010, however, indicate that there is likely to be a drop in both the 
global and the European market share whereas the average price of Nokia phones has 
risen from 61 Euros to 65 Euros. (Nokia, 2010a) 
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Figure 14. Nokia´s sales and market share in Europe 2005 – 2009(Nokia 2007, 2009, 2010c) 
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3.4. United States 
 
This section on the U.S. mobile phone industry will follow a similar structure to that 
presented for Europe in Section 3.3 to allow for a comparison of the two in Section 3.5. 
 
The U.S. mobile phone market inclined by 5,6 % to a value of $10,4 billion in 2009. In 
the same year, the total unit sales were 125 million units corresponding to a per-unit 
price of $83,2. (Datamonitor, 2010b) The historical value and growth of the market is 
illustrated in Figure 15. 
 
 
Figure 15. United States Mobile Phone Market Value (Datamonitor, 2010b:10) 
 
Similarly as in the case of the European market, let us now look at the historical 
development of the average handset price in the United States (Figure 16). Despite 
being a single numerical value (instead of an extensive data set), the average price gives 
us relevant information not only about the categories of phones that consumers buy (low 
end, smart phones etc.) but also about the business environment and the resulting 
competition in a given market. For instance, in Tanzania 80 % of the population 
interviewed for a study reported having bought a cell phone in the range of $40 – $80 
while very rarely exceeding $150. (Mpogole et al 2007) This figure clearly indicates 
that the competition takes place in the low-end instead of smart phones where high-end 
manufacturers such as Apple are absent. 
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Figure 16. Number of units sold and unit price in the United States (Datamonitor, 2010b:11) 
 
In the U.S. market, years 2004 to 2006 showed a clear decline in the number of units 
sold whereas the average price of a phone climbed steadily with the introduction of 
several series of smart phones. In 2007, the incline in the unit prices halted and turned 
into a sharp decline reaching a level of $114 in 2008. This sharp decline in the unit price 
was not even offset by a corresponding increase in the unit sales as the total market 
value dropped from $11.5 in 2007 to $9.8 billion in 2008.  
 
The development of the US mobile phone market value could be explained by various 
factors. Firstly, the increasing competition especially from the South Korean 
manufacturers Samsung and LG forced price cuts also among the traditional players 
(see market share development Figure 17). Second, the still on-going financial crisis 
escalated during 2007. The atmosphere created by a deepening distress in the financial 
markets spreading to the society caused both consumers and companies to reduce and 
postpone their spending, mobile handsets included. (Medford, 2008) Finally, as in the 
case of Europe, the development of mid-priced handsets to include functionalities 
earlier available only in the high-end has moved demand toward the low-end. 
 
Market shares 
In this section, the current competitive situation of the handset manufacturers is 
discussed. Due to the fact that mobile operators possess significant power on the U.S. 
market, a brief overview of the current composition is provided. Finally, the section 
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concludes with a discussion on Nokia’s recent historical performance in the United 
States. 
 
As seen in Figure 17, the current North American mobile phone market composition 
differs significantly from that of Europe. Looking at sales volume of all mobile handset 
(as opposed to only smart phones, see Figure 18), there are three major players 
Motorola, LG and Samsung that together account for about 70 percent of total sales. On 
this market the global leader Nokia only ranks fourth having with its 7 % market share 
having been bypassed by the Blackberry manufacturer Research In Motion (RIM) 
during 2010. 
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Figure 17. U.S. market shares 2009-2010 (Comscore 2009, 2010), 3 month averages (end date) 
 
If we look at the smart phone sales during 2009-2010 on the U.S. market the situation is 
very different (see Figure 18). Now, Research In Motion has a clear lead (37,6 % vs. 
24,2 %) to its closest competitor Apple but it has lost 5,0 percent of its market share in 
the course of a single year. Apple has retained its 25 percent share, the most important 
development being the extremely fast rise of Google (Android platform) from 2,5 % to 
19,6 % in one year. (Comscore, 2009; Comscore, 2010) Additionally, more recent 
research indicates that during Q2 2010, Android had already taken the lead in new 
shipments the corresponding shares being: Android 33 %, RIM 28 %, and Apple 22 % 
(NPD, 2010). 
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The rest of the manufacturers have lost market share fast. Still, in September 2009 
Microsoft had an almost 20 % share of smart phone sales but has since declined rapidly 
to its current 10 percent point. Similarly, Palm has gone from 8 % to 5 % mostly against 
Android. Finally, category Others includes several manufacturers such as Nokia that 
have been unable to gain significant market share for a variety of reasons including the 
structure of the market (different sales channels, operator power, strong domestic brands 
etc.). 
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Figure 18. Smart phone sales in US (Comscore 2009, 2010), 3 month averages (end date) 
 
Now, looking at the performance of Nokia in the United States since 2005 (Figure 19), 
we notice that Nokia has not always been in the category “Others”. In 2005 Nokia still 
had 18 percent of the U.S. market. (Nokia, 2007a) Looking further back, in 2002 Nokia 
had 35 percent of the market (Helsingin Sanomat, 2008). The decline from 35 % to 
around 7 % has been drastic and has taken place despite the management’s well known 
remark “not to rest before the United States has been reconquered” (see e.g. Tietokone, 
2009).  
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Figure 19. Nokia's sales and market share in North America 2005-2009 (Nokia 2007, 2009, 2010c) 
 
Nokia’s problems in the U.S. mobile phone market thus trace back to the beginning the 
last decade, i.e. to the years 2001-2003. The history of Nokia’s limited success and the 
reasons extracted from the case analysis will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 
and especially in Section 5.1. 
 
Finally, let us look at the composition of the U.S. market in the light of mobile operators 
and how Nokia is represented in their offering. As seen in Figure 20 there are currently 
two mobile operators, Verizon and AT&T, that together account for about 57 percent of 
the U.S. customer base. Sprint and T-Mobile follow straight after having a combined 
market share of 25 percent. Additionally, there is a Tracfone with a 5 percent share and 
other smaller operators having a combined 14 %. 
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Figure 20. Operators´ market shares, March 2010 (Comscore, 2010) 
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To have an idea of how well Nokia is represented in the consumer marketing of the 4 
largest US operators, their current (25th October 2010) websites were reviewed and the 
following data was gathered: 
• Total number of smart phones in offering 
• Total number of feature and multimedia phones in offering 
• Total number of Nokia phones in offering 
• Total number of Nokia feature and multimedia phones in offering 
• The brands in offering 
• Nokia’s models in offering 
 
The results are summarized in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Nokia on US operators Internet sites (Verizon, 2010;  AT&T, 2010; Sprint, 2010; T-Mobile 
2010) 
 
 
Smart 
phones 
Feature and 
multimedia 
phones 
Nokia 
smart 
phones  
Nokia 
feature and 
multi-media 
phones 
Brands in offering Nokia’s 
models in 
offering 
Verizon 27 27 0 1 HTC, Palm, LG, RIM, 
Motorola, Samsung, 
Android, Casio, Verizon 
7705 Twist 
AT&T 28 80 0 3 Apple, Palm, Samsung, 
Motorola, HTC, HP, RIM, 
Sony Ericsson, Pantech, LG, 
Sharp 
2330, 2720, 
6350 
Sprint 18 22 0 0 HTC, Samsung, Palm, LG, 
Sanyo, Blackberry, Motorola 
- 
T-Mobile 26 22 1 4 Samsung, Motorola, Sony 
Ericsson, LG 
2330, 2720, 
5130, 5230, 
E73 
 
Looking at Table 3 it is evident that Nokia has not been able to capture the potential of 
the operators as a sales channel. One out the four biggest operators (Sprint) does not 
represent any of the Nokia’s 26 models currently available on its US website and only 
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one (T-Mobile) has a smart phone (E73) on its listing. Moreover, in total the operators 
only offer 6 different Nokia models.  
 
3.5. Europe and the United States – similarities and differences 
 
This chapter started with an overview of the mobile phone market (Section 3.1) and 
continued with a five forces analysis of the same in Section 3.2. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 
discussed the essential characteristics of the European and the U.S. markets, 
respectively. In this final section, a brief comparison of the two markets will be 
provided having as an objective to highlight the most prevalent similarities and 
differences. 
 
 
 
 
Firstly, both the U.S. and European markets are developed and the consumers, in 
general, have fairly high purchasing power. Obviously, in both markets significant 
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Figure 21. The Mobile Phone Value System (adapted from Porter & Solvell, 2002) 
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regional differences exist. In Europe, there are countries such as Norway and 
Switzerland whose nominal gross domestic products (GPD) are in the order of $70 - 
80 000, whereas some Eastern European countries e.g. Romania are still below $10000. 
(World Bank, 2009) In North America, at least statistically, residents in all states 
possess significant purchasing power as the per capita nominal GPD ranges from 
around $25 000 of Mississippi to $51 000 of District of Columbia. (US Department of 
Commerce, 2010) However, the prevailing high levels of income inequality in the US 
make the make market highly fragmented. Moreover, the fact Europe consists of 50 
different countries some still being outside of the European Union increases the 
fragmentation of the market. 
 
In light of the composition of the market (see Figure 21), the European and U.S. 
markets present mostly similar but also fairly distinct characteristics. Despite the fact 
that all the actors (MNOs, vendors, dealers, standardization bodies etc.) are present on 
both markets, their roles are significantly different. From the mobile handset 
manufacturer’s point of view, there exists a critical difference: the market power of 
mobile (network) operators. While in Europe mobile handset manufacturers sell and 
market their products through various channels (direct, vendor, mobile operator etc.), in 
the United States the operators and their licensed distributors are the only major 
channel. This calls for different operation modes as the handset producers are 
practically forced to cooperate with the operators. Te difference becomes evident when 
looking at Nokia’s sales volume via different distribution channels in each continent 
(Figure 22). 
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Figure 22. Nokia's distribution channels in 2006 (adapted from Hyöty, 2011:150) 
 
Finally, the differences in distribution channels and relative power of actors also greatly 
influence the aptitude of a strategy for a given market. While in Europe and most other 
continents handset manufacturers with strong brands sell through operators, distributors 
and retailers under their own brand, in the United States only the ones who have 
collaborated with operators have succeeded in reaching high market shares. 
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4. Methodology 
 
In this chapter, the methodology applied in the empirical part of the thesis is presented. 
In Section 4.1 the fundamental elements of case study research will be explained 
followed by a discussion on the critical realism approach in Section 4.1.1. In Section 4.2 
the case study setting is described together with reasoning for the selection of this very 
case. The methodological choices related to data collection and data analysis are 
presented in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. Finally, validity and reliability of the 
chosen methodology are evaluated in Section 3.4.  
 
4.1. Case study research 
 
Case study as a social sciences research approach has significantly gained in popularity 
during the last couple of decades. Compared to other possible ways of conducting 
research in this field, such as surveys, histories, experiments, and epidemiologic 
research, case study offers significant advantages but also presents a significant number 
of unique challenges and disadvantages. Generally, case study can be considered 
appropriate and preferred when the researcher finds himself (or herself) asking “how” 
and “why” questions, has little control over events, and focuses on a contemporary 
phenomenon. (Yin, 2009) To cope with the inherent challenges related to the 
complexity of real-life and the vast amount of variables and data points available, 
several approaches have been proposed, e.g. process of inducting theory (Eisenhardt, 
1989) and triangulation (see e.g. Denzin, 1970). 
 
The case study research method can be defined as “an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. (Yin, 
2003:13) However, case studies can furthermore be categorized using a number of 
criteria. Firstly, a distinction can be made between single-case and multiple-case 
designs depending on the number of individual cases to be analyzed. Second, research 
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designs can be further divided into holistic (single unit of analysis) and embedded 
(multiple units of analysis). (Yin, 2009) Third, case studies may approach reality as 
something apprehensive to be discovered systematically (positivism) or as a social 
construct (interpretivism). Finally, case studies may be both qualitative and quantitative 
in nature. 
Since case studies entail such a wide range of methodological choices, many researchers 
suggest that case studies should be considered more of a research strategy that 
encompasses several methods than a method itself. While not following a strict set of 
methodological rules, case study allows for great flexibility and more in-depth analysis 
of the unfolding phenomena.  
 
The case study presented in this thesis follows a holistic single-case design utilizing 
both quantitative and qualitative data sources for greater validity and reliability. 
Furthermore, the research problem is approached from a critical realism perspective 
thereby not conceptually falling under neither positivism nor interpretivism. The case 
study itself is supported by analysis of the European and U.S. markets presented in 
Chapter 3. 
 
A chronological presentation of the case study and its link to preceding and subsequent 
parts of the thesis are illustrated in Figure 23. 
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Critical realism in case study research 
 
Traditionally, case study researchers have adopted either a positivistic or an 
interpretistic approach in their research. Those researchers who take a positivist position 
are often inclined to theory building through the use of multiple-case studies and put 
significant focus on internal and external validity, construct validity and reliability. 
(Yin, 2009)  By these and other means, positivists seek to enhance the reliability and 
credibility of their studies. On the other hand, interpretists deny the possibility of 
knowing what is real and claim that the information is always distorted by the 
observer’s own values, feelings etc. allowing only for an interpretation of the 
surrounding reality. (Healy & Perry, 2000) 
 
To serve as a middle ground between positivism and interpretivism, critical realism has 
emerged. Critical realists argue that there is a real world to be discovered although 
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being only imperfectly and probabilistically apprehensible. Like positivists, the 
supporters of critical realism look for ways to improve the reliability of the research by 
relying on multiple perceptions of participants and triangulating over multiple data 
sources. In this context, each participant’s perception is considered as a window into 
this existing reality. While interpretists might be interested in studying how the 
participant views the world, the window is considered a means to advance their 
understanding of the objective world. (Healy & Perry, 2000) 
 
The study of Nokia in the United States is approached from the viewpoint of critical 
realism for several reasons. Firstly, Nokia represents an interesting, somewhat 
exceptional, but still a single case and, as such, does not serve as a basis for theory 
development often sought after by positivists. (see e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989) On the other 
hand, one of the fundamental goals of this thesis is the better understand the reasons for 
Nokia’s relatively modest performance in that very market. Therefore, belief in the 
existence of a real world and reliable information is imperative. 
 
4.2. Case study setting 
 
The U.S. mobile phone market was chosen as the case context for multiple reasons. 
First, the United States represents a market where Nokia has been fairly unsuccessful as 
opposed to most other world markets. Second, the structure and the power relations of 
the players in the United States are very different to those of e.g. the European market. 
Finally, gathering data of the U.S. market is fairly straightforward as it is well 
documented and closely observed in most parts of the world. 
 
As recently as 2002, Nokia held a market share of 35 % in the United States, but this 
quickly eroded down to around 7 % in 2009. (O’Brian, 2009) However, the 
explanations given for the sharp decline and Nokia’s unsatisfactory performance in 
general, are mixed. In this work, the data from several public sources ranging from 
company reports and market data to newspapers and market analyses will be combined 
with selected interviews with key experts to shed light on the explanatory factors for 
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these phenomena. This empirical part of the study is preceded by a study of the 
European and U.S. mobile phone markets (see Chapter 3) that provides the basis for 
understanding the fundamental differences of different markets.  
 
Despite its longitudinal nature, the study does not seek to describe Nokia’s actions nor 
the U.S. market in chronological detail. Rather, the study covers a meaningful time 
period that allows a collection of a sufficient volume of secondary data so that both 
permanent and passing phenomena related to Nokia’s situation can be identified. Thus, 
this thesis will only consider the period ranging from year 2002 when Nokia was still 
thriving in the United States until 2011 when the primary and secondary data collection 
was completed. 
 
Nokia Corporation – an overview 
 
Nokia is a Finnish multinational telecommunications company headquartered in 
Keilaniemi, Espoo. In 2010, Nokia employed around 132 000 people (including 
NAVTEQ and Nokia Siemens Networks), reported net sales of EUR 42.4 billion from a 
total of more than 160 countries, had production in 9 and R&D presence in 16 countries. 
In 2010, Nokia remained the global market leader with a market share of 32 % down 
from 34 % in 2009. (Nokia, 2011c)  
 
The history of Nokia dates back to 1865 when Fredrik Idestam found the first wood 
pulp mill on the banks of the Tammerkoski rapids. Shortly thereafter, he found another 
mill by the Nokianvirta river (in the city of Nokia) that gave the company its name. Few 
decades later in 1898 the company moved to rubber business (founding of Finnish 
Rubber Works) and in 1912 expanded to cable business (founding of Finnish Cable 
Works). In 1960, the company again established its first electronics department 
followed by a merger of Nokia Ab, Finnish Cable Works and Finnish Rubber Works 
into Nokia Corporation. (Nokia, 2011d) 
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Nokia’s story as a manufacturer of mobile phones began in 1979 when Nokia and 
Salora introduced Mobira Ltd as their joint venture focusing on the development of 
NMT (Nordisk Mobiltelefon) phones. The first Mobira NMT phone was launched in 
1982. During the 1980s Nokia was still highly diversified producing televisions, 
computers, chemicals, military equipment etc. In 1992, Jorma Ollila became the CEO of 
Nokia and focused the company on telecommunications winding up non-core activities 
in a rapid fashion. (Nokia, 2011c) Within a few years of the election of Ollila, Nokia 
managed to reach dominance in the globalizing mobile phone market and has retained 
that position until current day. However, during the most recent years Nokia has faced 
intensifying competition and reports of internal and managerial problems have eroded 
the value of the company. (see Chapter 5) In February 2011, the current CEO Stephen 
Elop announced the historical joint venture with Microsoft focusing on the development 
of a new mobile phone ecosystem based on the Windows Phone 7 operating system. 
(YLE, 2011) 
 
In the course of its history, Nokia has gone through several large organizational 
changes. In the last couple of years, the changes in the business environment and the 
acquisition of the navigation services provider NAVTEQ and the joint venture with 
Siemens have necessitated further changes in the organization. The current (April 2011) 
structure of Nokia has been presented in Figure 24 and the organizational charts of 2006 
and 2008 in Figure 25. 
 
 
Figure 24. Nokia as of April 1, 2011 (Nokia, 2011) 
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Figure 25. Nokia in 2006 (left) and 2008 (right) (Nokia, 2008; Nokia, 2007) 
 
Currently, Nokia entails three business groups Mobile Phones, Smart Devices and 
Markets. While the Mobile Phones unit focuses on lower price segments, the Smart 
Phones unit is in charge of Nokia’s smart phone development and the research on future 
devices and platforms to support long-term profitability. Finally, the Markets business 
unit is responsible e.g. for the company’s supply chains, sales channels and marketing 
and branding functions. It should be noted that a significant part (revenue 2010 EUR 
12.7 billion) of Nokia’s business is in network infrastructure under Nokia Siemens 
Networks although excluded from this thesis. 
 
4.3. Data collection 
 
The data collection methods used to analyze the performance of Nokia in the U.S. 
context include interviews for primary data and public sources such as company reports 
and news for secondary data. Gathering of data is preceded by the analysis of the U.S. 
and European mobile phone markets presented in Chapter 3. The data collection for the 
case study is designed in a way that the most common explanations for Nokia’s 
unsatisfactory and deteriorating performance are charted through triangulation of 
several secondary data sources. These data are supplemented by selected interviews 
with key experts in the field. 
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Interviews 
The collected secondary data served as a basis for planning the content of the interviews 
and also the selection of the individuals to be interviewed. The interviews were 
primarily carried out in order to gain additional insight into the findings of secondary 
data and are therefore limited in number. The two persons interviewed were selected to 
represent different viewpoints (academia vs. business) to the studied phenomenon. A 
general description of the interviewees is presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Description of the interviewees 
Interviewee Position Organization 
Hannu Rauhala Senior Analyst (Telecommunications) Pohjola Bank, Finland 
Heikki Hämmäinen Professor (Networking Business) Aalto University, Finland 
 
Secondary data 
The secondary data collected for the case study consists of selected company reports, 
market and company analysis, news and magazine articles and books. The individual 
data sources among these are selected on the basis that they represent both material 
provided by the companies themselves and parties that can be considered unbiased. 
Furthermore, the secondary sources are selected so as to represent the views of different 
geographical locations (Finnish, other European, North American etc.) that may be 
inclined to a location-based bias. In addition to the geographical scatter, the sources are 
selected such to cover the period of 2002-2011 revealing the most common 
explanations at each time. 
 
An example of the secondary data sources is given in Table 5. A full list of all the data 
gathered for the study is given in Appendices I-III. 
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Table 5. List of secondary data sources (example) 
 Nr Type Date Source Title 
Why Nokia is/is not 
succesful in the US? 
What will/did Nokia 
do? Whose opinion? 
1 
News 
article 15.3.02 ClickZ 
Mobile Phone Sales 
Suffer First Negative 
Year 
CDMA the dominant 
technology - 
Gartner 
Dataquest 
analysts 
2 
News 
article 17.10.02 
Dagens 
nyheter 
Nokia försöker 
skrämma kunderna 
Nokia stronger is US since 
major operators have 
switched to GSM - Jorma Ollila, CEO 
3 
News 
article 28.1.03 Talouselämä Moto kampeaa Nokiaa 
Lack of operator 
cooperation - 
Thomas Lynch, 
Motorola CEO 
          CDMA technology - -||- 
4 
News 
article 11.6.03 
New York 
Times 
Nokia Warns of Lower 
Sales, Blaming 
Economy and SARS 
Nokia upbeat because of 
new product introductions   
Olli-Pekka 
Kallasvuo, Nokia's 
chief financial 
officer 
… … … … … … … … 
 
During the course of secondary data collection a total of 42 news articles, 4 books, 10 
company reports, 2 market analyses and 5 business blogs were reviewed. A more 
detailed description of the distribution of the secondary data sources over the study 
period 2000-2011 is given in Table 6. As evident in the table, more focus was put on the 
recent years to shed further light on the current situation. 
 
Table 6. Distribution of reviewed secondary data sources 2002-2011 
Type 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 TOTAL 
Nokia 
annual 
reports 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  9 
Market 
analyses 
       1 1  2 
Books 1       1 1 1 4 
News 
articles 
2 2 3 3 4 4 5 10 6 3 42 
Blogs         5  5 
Total 4 3 4 4 5 5 6 13 14 4 62 
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4.4. Data analysis 
 
Since the case study procedure consists of phases where gathering of primary data was 
preceded by the collection and analysis of secondary data (see Figure 23), the data 
analysis involved multiple stages. Firstly, the analysis of secondary data consisted of 
three stages: 
1) Reading the material 
2) Extracting explanations 
3) Categorizing explanations (or finding themes) 
 
In the first stage, the secondary data were read through and the parts of text containing 
relevant data were clearly marked. In the second stage, the different explanations were 
extracted into MS Excel. Finally, the explanations were categorized into themes. These 
themes can be defined as “abstract (and often fuzzy) constructs that investigators 
identify before, during, and after data collection”. (Ryan & Bernand, 2002) In this case 
study, themes are the high-level categories of explanations given for Nokia’s 
performance in the United States such as ‘increased competition’. This procedure 
included developing a codebook to reduce the data into appropriate categories. (Miles, 
1979) This codebook should develop through iteration throughout the study to best 
represent to most common general themes found in the material. (Ryan & Bernand, 
2002) 
 
Based on the analysis of secondary data, the contents of the interviews were drafted. 
The interviews followed a semi-structured format seeking to gain additional insight into 
the findings from the secondary data. All interviews were followed by immediate 
reflection and transcribed during the next couple of days.  
 
Finally, once the data were grouped into appropriate themes, a conceptual model was 
drafted to illustrate the occurrence of different explanations. This conceptual model was 
further extended to include the explanations that could be derived from the Chapter 3 
analysis of the European and U.S. markets. 
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4.5. Validity and reliability 
 
Although the case study presented in this thesis does not aim at theory building due to 
its limited focus on a single company on a single market, validity and reliability are 
nevertheless of great importance. Four tests have been commonly used to evaluate or 
establish the quality of empirical social science research (see e.g. Kidder & Judd 1986: 
26-29). These attributes include construct validity, internal validity, external validity 
and reliability. The tactics to be used when dealing with each test and the phase in 
which each tactic occurs are summarized in Table 7.  
 
Table 7. Case study tactics (Yin 2009) 
Attributes Case study tactic Phase of research in 
which tactic occurs 
Construct validity Use multiple sources of evidence Data collection 
Establish chain of evidence Data collection 
Have key informants review draft case study report Composition 
Internal validity Do pattern matching Data analysis 
Do explanation building Data analysis 
Address rival explanations Data analysis 
Use logic models Data analysis 
External validity Use theory in single-case studies Research design 
Use replication logic in multiple-case studies Research design 
Reliability Use case study protocol Data collection 
Develop case study database Data collection 
 
Construct validity 
To establish construct validity, several tactics were applied in the course of the study. 
First, the study utilizes several secondary data sources combined with interviews to 
increase credibility. Moreover, the findings from the primary and secondary data are 
reflected upon the analyses of European and U.S. markets to further enhance the 
credibility of the data. Finally, the interviewees were requested to review the case study 
report. 
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Internal validity 
For this study aiming at explaining the (unsatisfactory) performance of Nokia in the 
United States the concern for internal validity is critical. As pointed out by Yin (2009), 
trying to establish a causal relationship where x leads to y can be dangerous if the 
investigator is not aware or neglects the presence of some third factor z that may have 
caused or influenced y. Out of the tactics listed in Table 7, this thesis relies mostly on 
explanation building and addressing rival explanations. Since it is obvious that no one 
explanation or a well-defined set of explanations exist, the research presented here 
merely seeks to evaluate the credibility of each given explanation. 
 
External validity 
The third test of external validity is perhaps not directly suitable to evaluate this work. 
Even though single-case studies can be explained by theory, and theories can be tested 
and contrasted upon single-case studies, the studied phenomenon presents such a large 
number of unique properties that the existence of a single theoretical framework with 
explanatory power is highly unlikely. However, the case study still bases on a wider 
theoretical framework of economic theory especially in the fields of strategy, 
competition and international business. 
 
Reliability 
The objective of the last test ‘reliability’ is to make sure that if a later investigator 
followed the same procedures as described by an earlier investigator, the later 
investigator should arrive at the same findings and conclusions. (Yin, 2009) To achieve 
reliability, the case study of this thesis not only discusses the data collection and 
analysis procedures in detail (Chapters 3-5), but also presents the full database of all the 
secondary material used in the study (Appendices I-III). The full interview data is also 
available on request. 
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5. Case study findings 
 
In this chapter, the findings extracted from the analysis of secondary data and interviews 
are presented. In Section 5.1 the case of Nokia in the United States will be analyzed in 
light of the secondary data (42 news articles, 10 annual reports, 4 market analyses, 4 
books and 5 blogs) and interviews. In Section 5.2 the takeaways from the Section 5.1 
analysis will be taken to the industry and market level and serve to complement the 
market analysis of Section 3.3. 
 
5.1. Nokia’s performance in the United States 
Secondary data 
 
In the analysis of secondary data, all explanations given in the material were grouped 
into respective categories. The categories with occurrence N≥3 are given in Table 8 (for 
the full table refer to Appendix IV). 
 
Table 8. Themes in secondary data with N>=3 (* = reference to historical events) 
 
Explanation category 2002 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10 '11 Total 
1 
Problems in operator cooperation / 
operator market power   1 1 1   3 1 7 2 1 17 
2 Nokia focused on GSM while CDMA is 
preferred in the U.S. 1 1   2 3 1 2 2     12 
3 Symbian related problems               3 6 1 10 
4 Lack of tailored products for operators or 
U.S. market     1   2   1 3 3   10 
5 Intense/intensified competition     2 3 1 6 
6 Delay in offering clamshell phones  3 1 1 1* 6 
7 Phone design does not attract American 
consumers       1   1   1 1   4 
8 Too few high-end models available               2 2   4 
9 Offering not appealing/innovative 1 1 2 4 
10 Too few models represented by operators       1   1 1       3 
11 Application development environment                 2 1 3 
 
 59 
As seen in Table 8, the predominant explanation is related to operator cooperation 
which, again, stems from operator market power and their ability to dominate the supply 
chain. As Gartner analyst Carolina Milanesi puts it: 
“The market in the U.S. has always been dominated by the carriers, so they call 
the shots. And Nokia has had a difficult relationship with the carriers.” 
(Schwartz, 2009) 
In the book Winning Across Global Markets author Steinbock (2010) also states that: 
 
“In the United States Nokia has sought to build its own brand… What makes the 
U.S. business unique is that it is very much driven by carrier. In other markets, 
distributors and retailers also play a role.” 
 
Furthermore, Steinbock (2010) cites Nokia’s Chairman Jorma Ollila saying: 
 
“It’s not like we have 300 million+ customers in the U.S… There are four to five 
customers who control access.”   
 
The operators, obviously, have a somewhat different viewpoint: 
 
“The attitude at Nokia was basically: ‘Here is a phone. Do you want it?’ Nokia 
wouldn’t play by the rules here, and they have paid a price.” – an executive at a 
North American network operator (O’Brien, 2009) 
 
In the covered secondary material, problems in operator relations were mentioned 17 
times. Looking at the distribution over the examined time period, the first remarks are in 
2002-2004 while most occurrences take place in 2009. Thus, it appears that 
collaborating with operators in the U.S. has traditionally been a major weak point for 
Nokia. While Nokia had pursued a global strategy forcing operators to accept non-
tailored products, large operators seem to have developed resistance and combined with 
market power, the relationship between Nokia and U.S. operators had become inflamed. 
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However, Kari-Pekka Wilska, the president of Nokia Americas, stated in 2002 that 
Nokia had put a lot of emphasis on building solid operator relations in the United States, 
and Southwestern Bell, for example, had build a large logistics center close to Nokia’s 
plant in Dallas. (Häikiö, 2002) As also evident in the interview with Professor 
Hämmäinen (Section 5.2 Interviews), this was a moment in history where Nokia was 
still in good terms with the U.S. operators. 
 
Now looking at Nokia’s strategic responses (Table 9) we see that there were 7 occasions 
in 2005-2010 where Nokia has clearly indicated that it will focus more on operator 
cooperation. 
 
"We have definitely put more emphasis on our relationships with operators in 
the past 12 months” – P. Alapietilä, President at Nokia (Schwartz, 2006) 
 
“In the past, we had a one-size-fits-all mentality that worked well on a global 
basis but did not help us in this market. ... That has changed now, and there is a 
recognition within the company that we have had to change our attitude about 
how we approach this market.” – M. Louison, President of Nokia North 
America (O’Brien, 2009) 
 
Clearly, there was recognition at Nokia that its approach to the U.S. market needed a 
change. To improve its situation the company launched and promised to launch several 
tailored phones for the market (response #1) in addition to the additional focus on 
operator cooperation (response #2). However, the actions taken by Nokia don’t seem to 
have been adequate (see e.g. Figure 19). Although a general belief seems to exist that 
Nokia stuck to demands that the American carriers refused to accommodate, the details 
of the glitch remain to be disclosed: 
 
“Of course only Nokia and the carriers know the real issues. … The rest of us 
are speculating.” – M. Gartenberg, Analyst at Gartner (Boutin, 2010) 
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Table 9. Nokia's responses in secondary data 
  Nokia's actions 2002 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10 '11 Total 
1 
Lauched tailored phones for 
operators or U.S. market     2 1 2 3 3 4 1 1 17 
2 More focus on operator cooperation       1 1     4 1   7 
3 Launched new CDMA phones     1 1 2 1 1       6 
4 Launched clamshell phones     1   1           2 
5 Increased presence in the U.S.         1     1     2 
6 Adopted Windows Phone 7                   2 2 
7 
Cooperation with Sanyo to produce 
CDMA phones         2           2 
8 
Develop Symbian to match 
expectations                 1   1 
9 Develop Meego                   1 1 
  TOTAL 0 0 1 0 4 0 0 1 1 3 10 
 
 
The next explanation given in 12 sources is that of Nokia focusing on GSM instead of 
CDMA which was predominant in the United States. Davies (2006) describes the 
situation as follows: 
 
Initially, Nokia was convinced, along with almost everyone else, that 
Qualcomm's standard, called code division multiple access, or CDMA, would 
fail. Nokia instead focused on a competing standard that became the dominant 
wireless technology in the world. ... While CDMA has made inroads, GSM is 
still the most prevalent wireless technology in the world. But with high-profile 
carriers like Verizon and Sprint using Qualcomm's CDMA technology, Nokia 
and other wireless phone makers have realized they also must make phones 
using that technology if they are going to improve their sales. 
 
As the U.S. market remained fragmented in terms of technology with carriers 
controlling access, Nokia’s “one size fits all mentality” did not work in the United 
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States. Nokia promised, in several occasions, to tailor for the U.S. market and even 
specifically launch new phones with CDMA technology (response #3) to widen its 
CDMA portfolio but with limited success. This hesitation to implement CDMA also had 
its roots in the long-lasting debate between Qualcomm and Nokia over some CDMA 
related patents and Nokia’s reluctance to source CDMA chips from Qualcomm: 
 
“Nokia's weakness in CDMA stems largely from its resistance to buying 
computer chips from Qualcomm Inc., the San Diego firm that developed the 
technology. Most phone manufacturers buy their CDMA chips from Qualcomm. 
Nokia figured that by developing its own chip or using chips made by other 
manufacturers, it could avoid buying from Qualcomm, saving money in the 
process, analysts said. But the strategy didn't work, and Nokia lagged behind. “ 
-Hughlett (2006) 
 
In addition, Nokia had counted on Texas Instruments to provide them with competitive 
CDMA chips, but Texas Instruments had their focus on a different technology variation, 
CDMA 2000 EV-DV, not well accepted by the major operators who had opted for 
CDMA 2000 EV-DO. At that moment Qualcomm had around 90 percent of the CDMA 
chip market. (Davies, 2006) 
 
In more recent sources (2010-2011) there are no remarks on CDMA related problems, 
perhaps, due to part of the industry converging towards 3GPP Long-Term Evolution 
(LTE) based technologies instead of 3GPP2 CDMA. For example, Qualcomm 
announced in November 2008 that it favors LTE followed by a decision by Verizon 
Wireless to invest in LTE as the basis for its future wireless cellular network (Reuters, 
2008). Another reason might be the launch of competing products such as iPhone and 
Android phones that have intensified competition in the industry and drawn attention to 
other, perhaps, even more important issues. 
   
Third, in 10 instances in 2009-2011 Symbian was considered a possible root of Nokia’s 
problems in the United States. In a Forbes article Woyke (2010) summarizes Nokia’s 
Symbian situation as: 
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Well-regarded until about 2007, Symbian has suffered from its incompatibility 
with touch-screen devices. That defect has since been corrected, but Symbian is 
still largely viewed as outdated and unwieldy, particularly in comparison to 
sleek operating systems like Apple’s iOS and Palm’s webOS. 
 
Thus, Nokia’s Symbian should also be viewed in the context of its competitors. Without 
the presence of such strong new competition, Symbian and its recent, more developed 
releases could have been considered competitive for a much longer time. This 
competition may have also lead into a lot of people questioning Nokia’s Meego strategy 
and the relative sluggishness in its development. (see e.g. Gruman, 2010) Still, no 
matter what the actual reasons are, Nokia clearly hasn’t met the goals and expectations 
set for the development of its operating systems further complicating its already 
difficult situation in the United States.  
 
In response to the critique on Symbian and Meego development Nokia has announced 
to focus on the development of both operation systems (responses #8 and #9) 
facilitating ease of use and adding functionalities. As late as 2010 at Mobile World 
Congress head of Nokia Solutions Anssi Vanjoki announced that: 
 
“Operators haven’t accepted Symbian since it has been fragmented as a 
programming platform. Symbian 3 will change the situation. It is uniform as a 
programming platform. … Complaints have been going on for three years. They 
have been justified. Symbian 3 will end these talks.” (Salminen, 2010, originally 
in Finnish)  
 
It could be concluded, therefore, that Nokia had determined to reach its competitors by 
developing its existing Symbian operating systems while acknowledging its 
shortcomings. In the same talk Vanjoki also commented on Meego development by: 
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The Meego programming platform we started with Intel will take us permanently 
back back to the position in which are used to being. (Salminen, 2010, originally 
in Finnish) 
 
Summing up the two statements by Vanjoki, the direction seemed to be clear for Nokia 
and that was focusing on the two systems in the development of which Nokia had 
played a major role. However, shortly after nominating the new CEO Stephen Elop, 
Nokia announced a complete turnaround in strategy. On 11th February 2011, Nokia 
reported that it will adopt Windows Phone as its primary smartphone platform leaving 
Symbian to feature phones and Meego for “longer-term market exploration of next-
generation devices, platforms and user experiences” (Nokia, 2011e) followed by 
chairman and former CEO Jorma Ollila expressing his full support and approval of the 
new strategy saying that Nokia allied itself with Microsoft because the Symbian 
operating system would not have been sufficiently competitive in the long run. In 
addition, he added that this “was a very good situation from Nokia’s point of view 
because there were interesting partners on offer, and we were able to choose which one 
we could make the best deal with.” (YLE News, 2011b) 
 
Now, let us have a closer look at the development of the competitive situation in the 
U.S. market. In six cases, intense or intensified competition was given as a reason for 
Nokia’s weakening performance in the United States. It is worth noting that all of these 
instances fall into the period of 2008-2010.  
 
“Nokia faces competition everywhere. At the high end from Apple, in the 
midrange by Research in Motion, and by the Koreans and the Chinese in the low 
end.” - Sherief Bakr, a Citigroup analyst (Schwartz, 2009) 
 
“... the growing popularity of smartphones from Apple, Research In Motion, 
Samsung, LG, and the emerging dark horse HTC, are likely to deal Nokia’s U.S. 
hopes a series of crippling body blows.” (Medford, 2008) 
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As evident from the above citations, Nokia now faces increasing competition in the 
whole range of its offering. While manufacturers such as Apple and RIM have 
challenged Nokia in the midrange and high end, there is also now more competition in 
the low end, traditionally dominated by Nokia. In a way Nokia’s new strategy 
(discussed above) aims at covering the needs of the whole portfolio by offering 
Symbian S40 based devices (under Mobile Phones business group, see Figure 24) in the 
low end and Windows Phone OS based devices in the midrange and high end (under 
Smart Devices business group). Furthermore, Meego OS will serve as a basis for 
experimentation and certain models in the high end (Nokia 2011e) (see responses #6, #8 
and #9).  
 
Explanation #6 delay in offering clamshell phones was considered a fairly important 
factor in 2004-2006 when consensus developed that a bulk of consumers had a 
preference for clamshell models. 
 
“Nokia was late reacting to demand for clamshell phones, hinged models that 
flip open. Nokia had built its empire on the "candy bar" model, phones formed 
in one solid piece.” (Hughlett, 2006) 
 
Still, it appears that Nokia wasn’t simply late reacting to the change but they estimated 
that the market would develop in a different direction. Many analysts consider that 
Nokia’s foot-dragging was due to several reasons: 
 
"I think they felt the candy-bar phone would conquer all. It was a pride thing."  
Neil Mawston, Analyst at Strategy Analytics (cited in Hughlett, 2006) 
 
“It may have been an economic thing too. Clamshells are more expensive to 
make, requiring two separate circuit boards, one for each side of the hinge.” M. 
Hughlett (2006) 
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"Nokia thought, [The clamshell] can't be worth it. They just took a gamble and 
hoped it would be a fad." Neil Strother, analyst at NPD Group (cited in 
Hughlett, 2006) 
 
Regardless of the real reasons, the demand for clamshell phones developed rapidly in 
the United States and Nokia needed to react. Since 2004 Nokia has launched several 
clamshell models and the secondary data does not indicate clamshell phones as a 
problem area after 2006. Thus, it is probable that the absence of clamshell designs lead 
to some deterioration of Nokia’s market share in the U.S. but, eventually, the company 
managed to patch its device portfolio. 
 
Explanations #7 and #9 have to deal with the design, innovativeness and attraction on 
Nokia’s phones accounting and appeared 8 times in 2005-2010 in the secondary data. 
Vice president Jack Gold of Meta Group summarizes Nokia’s U.S. offering in 2005 as: 
 
"Nokia didn't have the coolness factor. They didn't really do flip phones; they 
were a little late with cameras, and they didn't push them. Coolness in the 
consumer space is a big deal, and they were stodgy."   
 
Two years later in 2007, leading analyst Jussi Hyöty of FIM Bank commented: 
“Design has been problematic for Nokia. – Motorola, Samsung and LG all have 
a strong portfolio of thin models, which probably explains why trend aware 
American consumers have bought these products” (YLE News, 2007, originally 
in Finnish) 
 
On top of these design related issues, Nokia’s offering not has been viewed as appealing 
since Nokia hasn’t been able to include its whole portfolio (explanation #8), especially 
high end devices (explanation #10), in the operators’ offering (see Table 3). This has 
evidently lead to a situation where many Americans currently view Nokia as a company 
focused on low-end and mid-range phones or not being familiar with the Nokia brand at 
all (see discussion on operator dominance in Section 5.2). However, this problem traces 
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back to problems in operator cooperation (#1) and lack of U.S. market specific models 
(#4) and cannot be solved in isolation. 
 
Finally, the last explanation #11 (with occurrence ≥ 3) deals with the application 
development environment and is fairly recent in nature (2010-2011). This criticism 
relates strongly to the Symbian environment that was considered fragmented as a 
platform for application development (see e.g. Salminen, 2010) and both Meego and 
Windows Phone operating systems aim at improving this situation (actions #6 and #9). 
In addition, Nokia tries to improve the existing Symbian environment by bringing Qt 
and web runtime application development frameworks for the developers: 
 
“It is difficult to develop applications for the basic Symbian, but this should also 
be fixed along with Qt and web runtime. Obviously, there is a lot of work to be 
done. One has to face the challenges with a humble attitude.” – Ari Jaaksi, Head 
of Meego Development at Nokia (Linja-aho, 2010, originally in Finnish) 
 
Thus, the difficulties that Nokia has experienced in the United States constitute a 
complex and interrelated set with identifiable historical patterns, but many have lasted 
for the whole duration of the study (2002-2011). In order to resolve these issues, Nokia 
taken a number of actions but the most critical problems related to operator cooperation 
and tailoring of products for the market still remain.  
 
 68 
Interviews 
 
Related to Nokia’s problems in the United States, the interviewees raised a number of 
important themes. Firstly, Hämmäinen (2010) states that Nokia’s situation in the United 
States has always been difficult both in handsets and on the network side. To fully 
understand what has been happening, Hämmäinen said, one has to comprehend that the 
two sides of Nokia’s business are linked and make the company vulnerable. 
 
“At Nokia, the network and the handset business have been connected. Nokia 
hasn’t been able to operate freely on the handset side. Traditionally, the 
operators have bought both handsets and networks from one supplier. The 
intentions of Nokia to separate the handset business from its networking 
business have lead to some operators telling Nokia that they would reconsider 
their network provider if Nokia didn’t comply. That’s why Apple, Google and 
Microsoft who come from a different direction haven’t been affected. They are 
not vulnerable in this way [since they don’t have network business].” 
(Hämmäinen, 2011) 
 
Thus, in many ways Nokia’s hands have been tied. With the operators calling the shots, 
Nokia has not been able to introduce phones with e.g. Internet capabilities since that 
was not in the operators’ interest. According to Hämmäinen (2011) it was not until 
Apple shook the operators with its iPhone that the U.S. operators allowed also others to 
launch phones with similar capabilities. Currently, he claims, Nokia could sell more 
freely if they only had competitive mid and high end models together with a competent 
brand.  
 
Rauhala (2011) agreed with respect to the operators’ dominance but also that Nokia’s 
strategy and the operators’ interests have been in a long-lasting conflict: 
 
“The operators desired tailored models while Nokia was aiming at large 
volumes and cost leadership. This combined with fast growth in China and Asia 
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in general and Nokia’s decision to focus on these markets. I guess it is natural 
not to focus on a market with wrong technology, that is operator-driven and 
presenting slow growth.” 
 
Another question also well covered in the secondary material is the availability of 
Nokia’s models (see Table 3). The unavailability, then, is a result of both consumer 
choice and operators maximizing their profit and other interests. 
 
“Nokia’s models are not available in the United States the way they are in 
Europe. One might ask to what extent this has been the consumers’ choice. 
Obviously, the operators offer what the consumers want but also what gives 
them the highest profits. This traces back to Nokia’s decision not to tailor and 
maintain the handset business separate from the operator business.” 
(Hämmäinen, 2011) 
 
Regardless of the reasons, not being well represented in the operators’ offering made 
Nokia appear a low-end brand and as Rauhala (2011) noted, their products were mostly 
viewed as substitutes for a packet of coffee. This also relates to the brand dispute 
between Nokia and the U.S. operators. Since both Nokia and the U.S. operators had 
strong brands both insisted on selling under their brand. (Rauhala, 2011) More recently, 
fighting fiercely for its decreasing market share, Nokia might be more willing to bend 
and assent to the operator’s requirements in exchange for a solid distribution deal and 
visibility in marketing. 
 
Finally, the Qualcomm dispute was also raised up by in one of the interviews 
(Hämmäinen, 2011). While at first Nokia refused to source chipsets from Qualcomm 
e.g. to cut down costs, they realized they started to lag behind, settled their controversy 
and restarted shipments. (see also Hughlett, 2006) 
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5.2. Characteristics of the U.S. market 
 
Since a structured analysis of the U.S. market was already carried out in Section 3.4, the 
purpose of this section is to complement that analysis with the observations that were 
gathered during the collection of primary and secondary data related to Nokia in the 
United States. Furthermore, since Section 5.1 already discussed (or at least touched 
upon) many of the characteristics of the market this section provides a brief overview of 
those findings, i.e. it does not intend to provide an extensive characterization of the 
market. 
 
“We felt we could teach the U.S. market how we do business elsewhere, and 
frankly, that failed. Now we just want to act, based on the needs and 
requirements of the market.” – O-P. Kallasvuo, CEO of Nokia (Landler, 2007) 
 
As pointed out by Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo (above), the U.S. market differs greatly from 
most other markets in the world. In what follows, the characteristics with the highest 
occurrence in the case study material will be discussed. 
 
Operator market power 
 
In Europe, mobile handset and operator businesses are still somewhat separated from 
one another even though the operator sales of subsidized (and locked) handsets has been 
growing e.g. due to the legalization of bundling (in Finland on the 1st of April 2006) 
(Liikenne- ja viestintäministeriö, 2008). The difference between the general European 
and U.S. sales channel models is presented in Figure 26. 
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It is worth noting that before the legalization of bundling in Finland, most of the 
handsets were sold by handset vendors and the link between handset vendors and 
operators was weak. However, in most European countries bundling has traditionally 
been legal and the link fairly strong. (Tallberg, 2004) 
 
In the secondary data, operator’s market power has been described e.g. as follows: 
 
“What makes the U.S. business unique is that it is very much driven by carrier. 
In other markets, distributors and retailers also play a role.” (Steinbock, 2010) 
 
“In the United States, operators have historically played a gatekeeper role, 
deciding which phones their subscribers can use for what rate and then steering 
them toward services controlled by the operator.” (Landler, 2007) 
 
“It’s not like we have 300 million+ customers in the U.S… There are four to five 
customers who control access.” - J. Ollila, Nokia’s Chairman (cited in 
Steinbock, 2010) 
 
The three quotations (above) well summarize the power possessed by mobile operators 
in the U.S. market. The last comment by the former CEO and current chairman Jorma 
Ollila clearly highlights the hold that the largest operators have of the sales channels 
and that, in practice, operators cannot be bypassed. In addition, operators tend to require 
tailoring of the phones including design, branding (e.g. T-Mobile Comet) or co-
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Figure 26. European (left) and U.S. (right) sales channel models  
(adapted from Tallberg 2004) 
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branding (Verizon iPhone), operator specific software and services and subsidization 
schemes: 
 
“Carriers have lots of clout, particularly in the U.S. They are the prime phone 
retailers, subsidizing the devices' cost by tying them to service plans. Carriers 
often want custom features, cosmetic and technical, that can raise costs for 
phone makers.” (Hughlett 2006) 
 
Senior analyst Hannu Rauhala clearly shares the observation: 
 
“The U.S. market is very much operator-driven. The operators decide which 
phones are sold, when and at what price. Their brands are strongest than those 
of manufacturers. --- The operators handle around 90 % of the distribution to 
the end customer. If you don’t get along with operators, you are out of the 
market.” (Rauhala, 2011) 
 
Professor Heikki Hämmäinen (interview #1) concurred, but added, that compared to the 
situation some years ago the operators now give handset manufacturers more freedom in 
product design (see also Section 5.1 Interviews).  
 
“The United States is a high end market and very operator centric. However, 
getting along with operators would now be easier if Nokia had good devices. 
The operators have loosened their grip, they are not as jealous anymore.” 
(Hämmäinen, 2011) 
 
Intense and changing competition 
 
The U.S. mobile phone market is one of the most competitive in the world, especially in 
the mid range and high-end. In the high-end segment, the launch of iPhone by Apple on 
the 29th of June 2007 (Levine, 2007) signified an irreversible moment for the industry 
followed shortly thereafter by the unveiling of the Android distribution on 5th 
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November 2007 (Hard, 2007). In The New York Times dated 10th December 2007 
Gartner analyst Carolina Milanesi summarized:  
 
“There’s no doubt competition [in the U.S. mobile phone market] is 
intensifying.” (Landler, 2007)  
 
For traditional mobile phone manufacturers the entering of traditional software 
companies not only added to the already fierce competition but also created ambiguity 
as to how the future of mobile phone business would look like. The then CEO of Nokia 
Olli Pekka Kallasvuo commented: 
 
“It’s very clear that Apple, Google and other players are bringing in a lot of 
new directions. Convergence is a nice, dandy word, but it means industries 
colliding.” (Landler, 2007) 
 
More recently (2009-2010), especially LG, Samsung, Apple and Android manufacturers 
have managed to increase their share of the market, putting the traditional companies 
under yet more stress. Furthermore, the profit margins in the end-high remain high 
(Mustonen 2010) due to successful differentiation both in hardware (cameras, display 
technologies, materials etc.) but even more so in operations systems and other software. 
 
”The markets for advanced phone models and combined devices are in the 
middle of a dynamic and very competitive time period in the Unites States…” 
(Mustonen, 2010, originally in Finnish)  
 
“The market share of Nokia will drop since the Koreans have already 
conquered half of the U.S. mobile phone market. Samsung and LG are 
developing devices that attract buyers. … Apple and RIM are going strong.”  
 R. Llamas, IDC analyst (cited in Herrala 2009, originally in Finnish) 
 
Senior analyst Hannu Rauhala (2011) concluded that competition is fierce as in 
consumer electronics in general but also different from that of Europe. 
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“The competition is of operator customerships. -- You have to discuss with big 
operators who are wholesale buyers and distributors to end customers.”  
(Rauhala, 2011) 
 
The transformation from hardware to software focus in the mobile handset industry has 
allowed traditional software companies to enter the market and yet intensified 
competition. Currently, it would appear that the change is irreversible and similar 
hardware will eventually be available for everyone. In the near future this development 
would mean a fundamental change in the business model leading to a competition of 
ecosystems (see e.g. Nokia 2011e) i.e. a combination of hardware, operating system, 
applications, application stores, services etc. Where this transformation leads remains 
open, but from the competition point of view it may actually serve to raise entry barriers 
and lower the number of companies in the industry. Instead of producing a mobile 
phone, companies will need to either develop their own or integrate into an existing 
ecosystem to survive, especially in the smart phone business where applications and 
operating systems play a major role.  
 
Professor Heikki Hämmäinen (2011) commented on the transformation as follows: 
 
“This doesn’t mean that hardware would be easy or secondary. But the profits 
and strategic moves will go to the software side [of the business]. -- Hardware 
manufacturers have fallen behind. All the Americans, Google, Apple, Microsoft 
etc. are software-driven. A critical difference is that software business is very 
dynamic and everyone including the CEO knows how to write code. – The 
hardware manufacturers are all ran by “bankers” who have no such 
understanding of the underlying technology. Thus, hardware companies cannot 
react as fast or make fast strategic changes.” (Hämmäinen, 2011) 
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Subsidization of phones 
 
Subsidization of sold phones is an aspect that also greatly distinguishes the U.S. market 
from most other markets in the world. While practically all phones are sold subsidized, 
the American consumers are not used to paying “the real price” of their mobile phones. 
As Boutin (2010) puts it: 
 
“Here, we expect our smartphones to be cheap (thanks to carrier subsidies as 
high as $350 for an iPhone) and our monthly bills to be high. That’s the 
opposite of most of the rest of the world, where the $32 unsubsidized Nokia 1616 
rules.” 
 
Even if Boutin’s reference to the ‘Nokia 1616 ruling in most of the rest of the world’ 
could be considered slightly misguided or, at least, rather U.S. centric homogenizing 
(most of) the rest of world into a low-end market he does make a good summary of the 
fundamental difference in the consumers’ mindset. In addition, buying the phone and 
the call plan separately does not usually pay off due to the fact one often ends up paying 
the same monthly fee with and without the phone. For instance, Verizon offers iPhone 4 
(16 GB) for $199.99 and a 450 minute monthly call plan for $39.99 with a 2-year 
contract. Without the iPhone 4 (regular price at Verizon $649.99), the call plan would 
still cost exactly the same $39.99. (Verizon 2011) Thus, getting the iPhone and the call 
plan separately would only allow one to avoid the 2-year engagement but cost $450.00 
more.  
 
The existing subsidization schemes practically leave the consumers no choice but to 
purchase their phone from the operator unless they are willing to assume the additional 
cost. This arrangement obviously contributes to the already substantial market power 
that operators possess. 
 
“The operators have had a strong role and a tight grip on handsets. What 
operators decide to offer dictates what will be sold.” (Hämmäinen, 2011) 
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CDMA technology 
 
Technology wise, the major U.S. operators have split up in two camps, namely, CDMA 
and GSM. While Sprint and Verizon networks are CDMA, T-Mobile and AT&T rely on 
GSM preferred in most of Europe. (German, 2011)  
 
“CDMA is an underlying technology for a cell phone network. Globally, the 
dominant technology is GSM, which Nokia helped develop. But in a few key 
markets--Japan, Korea and the U.S.--CDMA is big. … About half of the U.S. 
market runs on CDMA”. (Hughlett, 2006) 
 
This presents a challenge for mobile handset manufacturers as they have to ship phones 
with two different chipsets to cover the whole market. On top of tailoring (phone 
design, software etc.) phones for operators having to manufacture phones with different 
chipsets constitutes a major cost factor limiting the available economies of scale. Still, 
despite the additional costs involved, most mobile phone manufacturers have CDMA 
phones in their portfolio. Davies (2006) summarizes the situation from the 
manufacturer’s point of view as: 
 
“But with high-profile carriers like Verizon and Sprint using Qualcomm's 
CDMA technology, Nokia and other wireless phone makers have realized they 
also must make phones using that technology if they are going to improve their 
sales.” 
 
Added to this, CDMA phones don’t generally support SIM-cards and porting a phone to 
another carrier’s network is far from straightforward: 
 
“Since CDMA phones don't use a SIM card, you can't just pop in a new SIM for 
instant activation with a new carrier. Instead, you'd have to go to the desired 
carrier and have them activate for you. While that's technically possible, 
unfortunately, I'd say your chances are pretty slim. The CDMA carriers such as 
Sprint and Verizon Wireless prefer that you buy a phone from them, so I can't 
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see them being too excited about helping you circumvent that process.” 
(German, 2007) 
 
In the interview, Hämmäinen (2011) added that despite the introduction of GSM, that 
would have allowed separation of phone sales from subscriptions, the U.S. market had 
already established its standardized way of selling phones and subscription together and 
the operators were reluctant to change the state of things.  
 
“Technology wise the U.S. market presents some special characteristics that one 
should acknowledge. They didn’t believe in international standards. There’s 
been the CDMA camp, a strong TDMA camp. And GSM came on top of all the 
other things. One can’t understand the development of the market share of 
Nokia in the United States by looking at the aggregate figure without analyzing 
each technology separately.”  
 
Changing role of the mobile phone 
 
In addition to the above explanations with high occurrence in the secondary data, the 
interviews clearly raised two relevant themes. Firstly, there appears to be a difference in 
the way people view mobile phone as a device and the role of the Internet.  
 
“[The mobile phone] has become part of the Internet. That is the most 
significant fundamental difference between the European and American 
mindsets. While in Europe people think that Internet will come to the mobile 
phone, Americans consider mobile phones another means of accessing the 
Internet.” (Rauhala, 2011) 
 
Secondly, the whole industry has changed from hardware to software focus especially in 
the United States where the majority of large software companies have traditionally 
been located. This development has been facilitated by the maturation of hardware (i.e. 
display, processor, camera etc.) allowing software companies to only focus on their core 
business while adapting fairly standardized hardware. 
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“In mid 90’s the understanding was that Internet and data services will break 
through but they didn’t until around 2005. Before that the business was globally 
centered on speech and SMS. -- The technologies weren’t simply mature enough. 
-- Then the market gradually became software-driven, the Internet won over 
mobile and software over hardware and the Americans over the rest of the 
world.” (Hämmäinen, 2011) 
 
These changes also seem irreversible in the process where competition focuses on 
developing more complex ecosystems instead of individual devices. Another important 
aspect is that mobile phones will form only a part of the ecosystem that comprises 
desktop and laptop computers, tablets, other portable devices, operating system(s), 
application stores and so on. Parallel to the development of physical devices and 
software there are cloud services and virtualization that are gaining momentum and may 
be of great importance in the future. (Hämmäinen, 2011; Rauhala, 2011) 
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6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
Competition and transformation of the mobile phone industry have evoked increasing 
interest and discussion among both academics and practitioners. While in the late 1990s 
the mobile phone business was dominated by a few large MNCs traditionally strong in 
consumer electronics, the competitive landscape in 2011 is far more diverse and the 
competition has shifted towards software and ecosystems. Nevertheless, distinct 
geographical markets seem to retain some of their distinctive features related to overall 
market composition, market power, technologies etc. 
 
While in Europe, the mobile phone manufacturers have traditionally sold phones under 
their own brands through a large variety of retailers, the U.S. market remains strongly 
dominated by operators. The operators, who carry out close to 90 % of sales to the end 
customer, exercise their power e.g. by forcing their brands, require tailoring of the 
phones and create lock-in via heavy subsidies, family plans etc. In addition, while 
Europe has been fairly homogeneous with regard to network technologies, the operators 
in the United States have, until now, opted for two different technologies, namely, 
CDMA (Verizon and Spring) and GSM (T-Mobile and AT&T). 
 
The differences in the European and U.S. markets also become apparent when looking 
at the performance of Nokia, the case company, on the two continents. As implied by 
both secondary and primary data, Nokia has pursued an archetypical global or “one size 
fits all” strategy focusing on economics of scale in areas such as purchasing, production 
and logistics. Combined with the mobile operators requiring high levels of tailoring, 
branding and control over distribution, Nokia has been unable to develop an offering 
that would meet the strategic imperatives of the two. Moreover, Nokia has publicly 
promoted GSM further complicating its relations with operators running CDMA 
networks. This development has lead to the operators representing very few Nokia 
models with practically none in the high end. 
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During the last decade or so, Nokia has claimed a number of times that it will recapture 
its lost market share and come to terms with the American operators. Apparently, the 
efforts have been inadequate. As Rauhala (2011) stated, the U.S. operators are 
practically giving away inexpensive Nokia phones to their customers as a substitute for 
a packet of coffee for visiting their stores. On the other hand, he also concluded that 
Nokia does have good opportunities, very little to lose, and with the right partner a real 
chance to turn the situation around. 
 
The main research questions were formulated as follows: 
1) What are the specific characteristics of the European and the U.S. mobile 
phone markets? 
2) In what respect are the two markets fundamentally different and why? 
3) Why has Nokia been unsuccessful in the U.S. market? 
 
6.1. Theoretical implications and directions for future research 
 
Even though this thesis does not aim at theory building as such due to inherent 
complexity of the studied phenomena and unsuitability of the selected single case 
methodology for theory building, the framework of Figure 27 will be discussed in light 
of the findings of the study. Additionally, the findings serve as a basis for proposals for 
future research.  
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Figure 27. Analytical framework 
 
Looking at the micro environment from the viewpoint of the mobile phone 
manufacturers there are several important implications. First, in the studied industry the 
links between the different actors (i.e. suppliers, distributors and customers) are 
generally strong and their roles often overlap. In the United States mobile operators 
typically play a dual role of a customer to the mobile phone manufacturer and 
distributor to the end customer. This is also reflected when looking at the channel 
options available to the handset manufacturers. While the manufacturers source most 
components (processor, camera etc.) from a variety of suppliers in both Europe and the 
U.S., the only feasible sales channel to reach the end customer in the U.S. is through 
mobile operators (see sections 3.3 and 5.2). In the European market, however, a greater 
number of channel options are available since mobile operators have significantly less 
control over the distribution network. Thus, in Europe handset manufacturers carry out 
not only wholesales to the mobile operators but also sell via distributors and retailers, 
and directly to the end customer in flagship stores and Internet sites (e.g. 
www.nokia.com).  
 
In regard to competition, the research revealed a number of important implications. 
First, while in Europe mobile handset manufacturers compete over consumers’ minds, 
the marketing and negotiation efforts in the United States are typically targeted at 
mobile operators who play the role of a gatekeeper to the consumers (Landler, 2007). A 
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few handset manufacturers (Nokia) have made an attempt to bypass the operators and 
sell directly the end customers but with limited success. Second, in both Europe and the 
United States, the competition, especially in the high end, has moved from hardware to 
software focus (Hämmäinen, 2011). Complemented by the introduction of the Android 
OS, this shift has significantly changed the competitive landscape of the industry while 
new players (e.g. HTC) have acquired significant shares of the market. This has also 
added the overall degree of competition in the industry (see Chapter 5). The imperfect 
nature of competition and its causes will be discussed later while reflecting upon IO 
economics. 
 
The findings related to the increasing complexity of the business network, linked actors, 
overlapping roles and struggle over control find support in earlier research. Where 
Dedrick & Kraemer (2007) demonstrated the efforts of PC manufacturers to streamline 
their distribution channels and remove middlemen, Li & Whalley (2002) showed how 
the traditional value chains of the telecommunications industry have already turned into 
more complex networks with new forms of competition. The recent development in 
mobile technologies has further added to the complexity and led to a discussion on yet 
more complex mobile ecosystems that spread out over several traditional industries 
(Basole, 2009; Gueguen & Isckia, 2011).  
 
Concerning future research, several interesting directions could be identified with 
respect to the micro environment. While based on the covered material the European 
and the U.S. markets both present unique characteristics in terms of their composition 
and competition, the (historical) reasons why such differences have come to be is not 
self-evident. Further research could be directed, for instance, at examining how the U.S. 
mobile operators have managed to acquire such market power while their European 
counterparts have not. Based on the work presented in this thesis, this new comparative 
research would be likely to touch a wider range of at least economic, technological and 
political factors and be highly interdisciplinary in nature. Second, focusing on the 
characteristics of competition in the mobile phone industry and the way it has changed 
in recent years would constitute a challenging study item. More specifically, one might 
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focus on the disruptive technology-driven change (from hardware to software), its 
effects on industry boundaries or the rise of Asian competitors in Western markets.  
 
Now looking at the findings from the perspective of International Business as a 
discipline a number of implications can be identified. First, from the perspective of 
international business operation modes (see Figure 3) we found that in the mobile phone 
industry companies such as Nokia employ a wide range of modes but also that clearly 
different modes are used in different markets. Of the contractual modes the most recent 
example would be that of Nokia entering an alliance with Microsoft to, among other 
aims, gain better access to the U.S. market. In regard to exporting modes, due to 
financial and other resources available to an MNC, mostly direct exporting and own 
sales office / subsidiary modes are used while indirect exporting is marginal.  
 
The use of investment modes was also found to be widespread. Nokia, for example, 
announced on 19th June 2007 the formation of Nokia Siemens Networks to strengthen 
its position on the network infrastructure market and to gain access into new markets 
where Siemens had established a permanent foothold. In addition, Nokia had for long 
established factories in low-cost countries and founded R&D centers around the world 
(NRC 2011). During the period of 2000-2010 Nokia also acquired a total of 30 
companies including investments in minority positions (Nokia, 2011g). 
 
Even though the work presented in this thesis does not concentrate on operation modes 
alone, the use of operation modes forms an integral part of mobile handset 
manufacturers’ strategies to access and compete on foreign markets, and the decision on 
which modes to choose stems from its global strategy (Kim & Hwang, 1992). Further 
research could be directed e.g. in examining the differences in handset manufacturers’ 
operation mode strategies in different markets as well as between manufacturers in each 
given market.  
 
The mobile handset business is one the clearest examples of a truly global industry. The 
globalization impact on the mobile phone industry has become extremely visible as 
handset manufacturers operate via extensive global networks sourcing components, 
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funds and people around the world and market their products across continents together 
with other MNCs with complimentary offerings. Based on the analysis presented in this 
thesis it can be concluded, however, that significant differences in market structure and 
preferences still exist and e.g. opting for a global “one size fits all” marketing strategy 
would not suit all companies. These findings are in line with Zhang & Prybutok (2005) 
who stress that despite similar levels of development, the differences in technologies, 
usage patterns and political systems require adjusting on handset manufacturers’ part. 
Further research could be carried out e.g. to assess the “degree of global operations” of 
each of the large manufacturers to assess the benefits and costs of scattering operations.  
 
Related to both globalization and brand management the findings of the thesis raise 
another interesting topic of possible future research. Where Nokia has been well-known 
for its global brand and its reluctance towards co-branding and especially selling under 
an operator brand, it seems that many companies need to a greater or lesser degree adapt 
to each market also regarding their brand. Rauhala (2011) believes that Nokia, for 
example, will most likely primarily utilize the brand of Microsoft when approaching the 
U.S. market and Nokia in other markets. Apple, like Nokia before, has also been 
extremely consistent in insisting the use of its brand including its visual elements. 
Examining how different mobile phone manufacturers use their brands and to what 
degree they adapt would make interesting future research. 
 
The IO economics (see Section 2.4) and the related theories, then, provide a solid basis 
for an analysis of the mobile phone industry. Since IO economics is based on the 
assumption of imperfect competition, analyzing e.g. the imperfections resulting from 
the market power of mobile operators or oligopolistic competition between the handset 
manufacturers would make interesting research topics. In addition, some companies 
(e.g. Apple) have recently been able to differentiate their offering in a way that has 
allowed them to reach clearly higher than average profits while others are struggling to 
survive. From the marketing point of view, analyzing product differentiation, branding 
and pricing strategies would also make interesting contributions to the IO field. 
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The central SCP (Structure – Conduct – Performance) paradigm related to the IO 
economics could also be studied more closely in light of the mobile phone industry. One 
might claim, for example, that Europe would perform more efficiently as a market since 
the structure of the market is such that many companies compete directly over 
consumers while in the United States few mobile operators practically dictate what 
products are sold and by what means. The more liberal structure of the market would 
thus allow companies to act in a more efficient way leading to better locative efficiency. 
However, the subsidies offered by most operators in Europe and the United States add 
another imperfection whose effect is not straightforward to analyze. (see e.g. Daoud & 
Hämmäinen, 2004) While selling through the (subsidized) operator channel generally 
translates into splitting the profit margin with the operator, the subsidy may also 
persuade consumers into buying more expensive (and higher profit) devices and 
replacing their handsets with new ones more frequently. Moreover, the operators tend to 
contribute to marketing and promotion, and together with the cost benefits of whole 
sales allow cost reductions to handset manufactures. 
 
6.2. Managerial implications 
 
From a managerial point of view, the findings of the research have several implications 
for businesses involved in the mobile phone industry. Firstly, the mobile handset 
industry is one that has historically experienced extremely fast and often unpredictable 
changes. The U.S. market that was once considered stagnated presenting low levels of 
sophistication quickly became the leading market for high-end mobile devices. In 
addition, the mid- and high-end of the industry quickly became software-driven which 
attracted companies such as Google, Apple and Microsoft into the market and caught 
many of the traditional mobile phone manufacturers off guard. Thus, the companies 
involved in the mobile phone business need to actively follow trends and look for 
indicators of change. Obviously, the companies also need to be proactive in the sense 
that they, where possible, innovate and create change (take Apple and the tablet market 
for example). This calls for far greater agility than necessary in most industries. 
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Secondly, the global mobile phone (or device) market is far from homogeneous. 
According to Rauhala (2011), in the European market, the mobile phone is still 
considered a “Swiss Army knife” that consolidates whatever surrounds it, but the U.S. 
consumers view mobile phones as one means of using applications and services e.g. the 
Internet. Although not investigated within this thesis markets of e.g. Africa and Asia 
would add another dimension to the heterogeneity of the world market due to 
differences in purchasing power, tastes, technologies etc. Moreover, the markets are 
very different in regard to their composition. While in Europe, companies like Nokia 
may successfully reach the end customer via several different channels, in the United 
States, companies need to be aware of the operators’ control over the whole distribution 
network. However, given the dynamic nature and the constant struggle for power 
between the different players in the market, the situation may obviously change at some 
point. 
 
Thirdly, based on the analysis of Nokia in the United States there are, again, several 
implications. Nokia seemed to believe that it could conquer the U.S. market using the 
same strategy that had served it well elsewhere despite the operator dominance. 
Looking at the performance of Nokia in the United States it would seem clear that a 
separate U.S. strategy focusing on the specifics of the market would have been needed. 
Additionally, while looking at the growth in markets such as China and India, Nokia 
seemed the neglect the potential and importance of the United States as a trend-setter on 
a global scale leading to the Nokia brand losing a significant share of its monetary 
value. Finally, it would seem that a company once known for its exceptional strategic 
agility became, to some extent, incapable of transforming and shaking off its legacy 
factors. 
 
 87 
6.3. Limitations of the study 
 
The research presented in this thesis was based on an analysis of primary data 
consisting of two interviews and secondary data encompassing 9 annual reports, 2 
market analyses, 4 books, 42 news articles and 5 blogs. The secondary material was 
spread along the research time span, i.e. years 2002-2011, while both interviewees were 
carried out in 2011.  
 
The research presented in this thesis is limited for several reasons. At the outset, the 
observed phenomena were approached from the viewpoint of critical realism (see 
Section 4.1.1) assuming that even though a factual reality exists it is only imperfectly 
apprehensible as the observations are distorted by the observer’s own values, feelings 
etc. In order to enhance validity and reliability, the thesis relied on triangulation over 
multiple data sources consisting of both primary and secondary data. Nevertheless, the 
number of data sources was inevitably limited and due to the scarcity of available 
academic research, the thesis relies mostly on non-academic secondary data whose 
reliability, in some cases, could be questioned. 
 
While the Nokia in the United States case brought another angle of observation and 
better insight into the U.S. market its explanatory power is limited. The analyzed case 
focused on a single company on a single market and only during a limited time span. 
Thus, the case alone does not allow generalization to other markets or companies and is 
to be considered descriptive rather than normative. 
 
Finally, the entire study relied on information that was publicly available or published 
in the course of the study. Especially when analyzing the problems that Nokia has had 
with the carriers in the United States, this can be considered a major limitation. Even 
though some effort was made in order to gain access to insiders it quickly became 
obvious that both contractual and emotional hindrances prevented sharing such 
information also due to the relative proximity of the events.  
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Appendix I. Reviewed books 
 
Books 
Nokia - The Inside Story 
(2002) 
B1-1: Nokia had become well recognized by 1999 in the US while 
the brand strengthened against competitors such as Motorola.   
B1-2: Nokia had worked closely with operators AT&T, Sprint and 
Southwestern Bell. 
B1-3: Nokia became the market leader focusing on digital phones, 
an area which progressed slower in the US than in Europe. 
 
Nokia - Matka maailman 
huipulle (2009) 
B2-1: Organizational changes within Nokia 
B2-2: Nokia not succesful in making deals with operators (said to 
probably be the most important reason) 
B2-3: Nokia late in following hypes & fashions 
B2-4: Nokia has avoided CDMA 
B2-5: Disputes with Qualcomm 
B2-6: Nokia decided to tailor products for the American market 
(Kallasvuo) 
Winning Across Global 
Markets - How Nokia 
Creates Strategic 
Advantage in a Fast-
changing world (2010) 
B3-1: Nokia not experienced in tailoring for operators 
B3-2: Operators dominate, "four to five customers who control 
access" -Jorma Ollila 
B3-3: Nokia tried to adapt America to its models rather than 
adapting its offerings to the US market, "one size fits all mentality"-
Mark Louison (president of Nokia North America) 
B3-4: Nokia decided to tailor its offering for operators and the US 
market 
Sijoittaja 
Yritysstrategioiden 
Pauloissa – Intohimona 
Nokia (2011) 
B4-1: Clamshell crisis lead to a decline in market share 
B4-2: Operators dominate, bad relationship with operators 
B4-3:Brand conflict operators vs. Nokia 
B4-4:Nokia had weak negotiation power in the U.S. 
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Appendix II. Reviewed news articles and blogs 
 
 Nr Type Date Source Title 
Why Nokia is/is not 
succesful in the US? 
What will/did Nokia 
do? Whose opinion? 
1 
News 
article 15.3.02 ClickZ 
Mobile Phone Sales 
Suffer First Negative 
Year 
CDMA the dominant 
technology - 
Gartner Dataquest 
analysts 
2 
News 
article 17.10.02 
Dagens 
nyheter 
Nokia försöker skrämma 
kunderna 
Nokia stronger is US since 
major operators have 
switched to GSM - Jorma Ollila, CEO 
3 
News 
article 28.1.03 Talouselämä Moto kampeaa Nokiaa 
Lack of operator 
cooperation - 
Thomas Lynch, 
Motorola CEO 
          CDMA technology - -||- 
4 
News 
article 11.6.03 
New York 
Times 
Nokia Warns of Lower 
Sales, Blaming 
Economy and SARS 
Nokia upbeat because of 
new product introductions   
Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo, 
Nokia's chief financial 
officer 
5 
News 
article 7.4.04 
New York 
Times 
In a Surprise, Nokia 
Warns That Its Sales 
Will Be Down Lack of clamshell designs - 
Barnaby Feder, 
journalist, Heather 
Timmons, journalist 
6 
News 
article 15.10.04 
New York 
Times 
Nokia Profit Off in 
Quarter; Handset Price 
Cuts Cited 
Too few clamshell designs, 
color screens and cameras - 
Alan Cowell, 
journalist 
          Lack of focus   
Jack Gold, analyst, 
META Group 
7 
News 
article 17.12.04 
YLE (Finnish 
broadcast 
corporation) 
Nokia ryhtyi 
taistelemaan 
markkinaosuudestaan Lack of clamshell designs Launch shell phones Gartner, inc. 
          
Problems in operator 
cooperation 
Tailor phones for 
operators -||- 
          
Phones not tailored for the 
US market - -||- 
8 
News 
article 24.1.05 Fortune Has Nokia lost it? Lack of shell phones - 
J. Ollila, CEO of 
Nokia 
          
Problems in operator 
cooperation - 
Tim Boddy, Analyst, 
Goldman Sachs 
          Design not attractive - 
-||- and Jack Gold, 
vice president of Meta 
Group 
            
More focus in 
operator cooperation 
Pekka Ala-pietilä, 
President, Nokia 
9 
News 
article 21.4.05 
Dagens 
nyheter 
Nokia tappar på 
mobilsidan 
Nokia is weak in 
technologies used in the 
United States   Jorma Ollila, CEO 
10 
News 
article 13.6.05 USA Today 
Nokia patches portfolio 
with 7 new phones 
Few CDMA phones in 
offering 
Nokia launched 3 
new mid-priced 
CDMA phones for the 
US market 
Hannu Rauhala, 
Analyst, Opstock 
Securities 
          
Few models in offering in 
the US in general   -||- 
11 
News 
article 5.3.06 TMC News 
Nokia seeks to reclaim 
U.S.: global leader 
believes new models 
and deal with Sanyo will 
return it to the top of 
sales chart Lack of CDMA phones 
Joined CDMA 
operations with 
Sanyo in Feb 2006 
John Jackson, 
Analyst, Yankee 
Group 
          Lack of clamshell phones 
Introduced clamshell 
models in 2004 
Neil Strother, Analyst, 
NDP Group 
          
Lack of tailoring for the 
operator 
Introduced tailored 
models for operators 
Tim Eckersley, Nokia 
senior VP for 
marketing in North 
America 
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12 
News 
article 21.4.06 
Sign on San 
Diego 
Nokia falls short of 
wireless goals Lack of CDMA phones 
Joined CDMA 
operations with 
Sanyo in Feb 2006 
Timo Ihamuotila, 
Senior Vice President 
CDMA phones at 
Nokia 
13 
News 
article 22.6.06 Digitoday 
Nokia ei vetäydy USA:n 
cdma-markkinoilta 
Lack of CDMA phones in 
the offering 
Provision of 
subcontracted CDMA 
phones for the US 
market 
Doug Dawson, 
Nokia's 
communications 
director 
14 
News 
article 10.8.06 Digitoday 
Kallasvuo: Nokialta 
erikoismallit 
Yhdysvaltoihin 
Lack of tailored products 
for operators 
More cooperation 
with operators 
Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo, 
Nokia's CEO 
            
Tailored phones for 
operators -||- 
15 
News 
article 15.1.07 YLE Uutiset 
Nokialla vaikeaa 
Yhdysvalloissa Design not attractive   
Jussi Hyöty, FIM 
Bank analyst 
          
Trouble in operator 
cooperation   
 Tero Kuittinen, 
Nordic Partners 
analyst (B) 
16 
News 
article 10.4.07 Talouselämä 
Nokia iskee 
amerikkalaiseen 
makuun 
Products not well 
presented in retail shops - Retailer 
          Operator relations - Journalist 
          
Top models not attractive 
to consumers - 
Tero Kuittinen, Nordir 
Partners Analyst 
            
Introduce new 
products together 
with operators 
O-P. Kallasvuo, CEO 
of Nokia 
17 
News 
article 10.8.07 Business 2.0 
Nokia: Smart phones, 
few US buyers 
Few CDMA phones in the 
offering   
Michal Rev Lam, 
Journalist 
          
Nokia phones non-
subsidized   -||- 
            
Focus on high margin 
phones (Gartenberg's 
opinion) 
Michael Gartenberg, 
Research Director, 
Jupiter Research 
18 
News 
article 10.12.07 
New York 
Times 
Nokia Pushes to Regain 
U.S. Sales in Spite of 
Apple and Google 
Nokia reluctant to work 
with operators 
Nokia promised to 
adapt to the US 
market 
Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo, 
Nokia's CEO 
19 
News 
article 10.1.08 Tietokone 
Nokia jopa 
nelinkertaistaa USA-
erikoismallit 
Lack of tailored products 
for operators 
Nokia promised to 
deliver 6-12 tailored 
phones for the US 
market 
Mark Louison, Chief 
of Nokia US 
20 
News 
article 18.4.08 Kauppalehti 
Yhdysvaltain 
finanssikriisi tarrasi 
myös Nokiaan 
Weak presence in the US 
market 
Tailored odm 
products for operators 
Rick Simonson, Head 
of Nokia Mobile 
Phones 
21 
News 
article 28.4.08 Kauppalehti 
Nokia menetti 
älypuhelinmarkkinoita 
Intensified competition 
(RIM and Samsung)   
Neil Mawston, 
Leading analyst, 
Strategy Analytics 
22 
News 
article 5.5.08 Reuters India 
Nokia to offer many new 
phones in U.S. 
Lack of CDMA phones, 
few models offered in the 
US 
Launch CDMA 
phones and tailor 
phones for operators 
Alastair Curtis, 
Nokia's chief designer 
23 
News 
article 19.11.08 Red herring 
Recession To Stall 
Nokia's U.S. Invasion 
Problems in operator 
cooperation - 
Cassimir Medford, 
Journalist 
          
Increasing competition by 
Apple, RIM etc.  - -||- 
          The recession - -||- 
          Lack of CDMA phones - -||- 
          Offering not compealing - 
Shahid Khan, 
Analyts, IBB 
Consulting  
24 
News 
article 12.1.09 Fortune 
Nokia's North American 
problem 
Lack of adaptation to the 
US market - 
Jessi Hempel, 
journalist 
          
Lack of operator 
cooperation - -||- 
            
Increased presence 
in the US (opened 
offices and R&D) -||- 
 108 
            
Started tailoring 
phones together with 
operators 
Mark Louison, Chief 
of Nokia US 
25 
News 
article 29.5.09 Kauppalehti 
Nokia räätälöi lisää 
USA:han (Not mentioned) 
Develop tailored 
products for the US 
market 
Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo, 
Nokia's CEO 
            
Closer relationship 
with distributors -||- 
26 
News 
article 18.8.09 Kauppalehti 
Nokian ahdinko 
pahenee USA:ssa 
New entrants gain market 
share - 
Ramon T. Llamas, 
Analyst, IDC 
          
Operators represent only 
Nokia's low-end devices - -||- 
27 
News 
article 2.10.09 
Talouselämä 
(citing 
Kauppalehti 
Optio) 
Kallasvuon selitysten 
selitykset 
Problems in operator 
cooperation 
Deepen operator 
cooperation 
Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo, 
Nokia's CEO 
          
Lack of operator specific 
products 
Have developed 
tailored products with 
operators -||- 
28 
News 
article 18.10.09 
New York 
Times 
Nokia Tries to Undo 
Blunders in U.S. 
Not tailoring its products 
for the US market 
More focus on 
operator cooperation 
Ari Hakkareinen, 
Nokia Business 
Development 
Executive 
          
Focus on European 
standards (GSM) instead 
of American (CDMA)   
Kevin O´Brian, 
Journalist 
          Operator dominance   
Neil Mawston, 
Leading analyst, 
Strategy Analytics 
29 
News 
article 22.10.09 Kauppalehti 
Nokia häviämässä pelin 
älypuhelimissa 
Usability problems 
(Symbian) - 
Journalist, Strategy 
Analytics 
          Intense competition - -||- 
30 
News 
article 4.11.09 Kauppalehti Nokian ikuisuushaaste 
Operators' market 
dominance - 
Ramon T. Llamas, 
Analyst, IDC 
          
Lack of competitive high-
end phones - -||- 
31 
News 
article 6.11.09 Kauppalehti 
Nokia asema USA:ssa 
käy entistä 
tukalammaksi 
Operators' market 
dominance - 
Neil Mawston, 
Leading analyst, 
Strategy Analytics 
          
Operators support only 
selected platforms (not 
Symbian) - -||- 
32 
News 
article 18.11.09 Kauppalehti 
Megaoperaattorit 
Nokian suurin uhka 
Operators' market 
dominance - 
Martti Häikiö, 
professor 
33 
News 
article 12.12.09 
New York 
Times 
Can Nokia Recapture Its 
Glory Days? Bad user experience - Journalist 
          
Problems in operator 
cooperation - 
 Carolina Milanesi, 
Analyst, Gartner 
          
Sluggishness in 
developing clamshell 
phones - Kai Oistamo 
          Intense competition - 
Sherief Bakr, Analyst, 
Citygroup 
34 
Business 
blog 15.2.10 Venturebeat 
Why can't Nokia sell 
phones to Americans 
Nokia declined to tailor 
phones for operators 
Tailor products for the 
US market (analyst's 
opinion) 
Michael Gartenberg, 
Analyst, Altimeter 
          Nokias are not trendy   
Paul Boutin, 
Journalist 
          
Phones in offering lack 
high-end features   -||- 
          
Different comsuming 
habits (preference to 
subsidized phones, phone 
complemented by laptops)   -||- 
35 
News 
article 16.2.10 Kauppalehti 
Nokia uskoo nousuun 
USA:ssa 
Operators dislike Symbian-
platform (dispersed, not 
user-friendly) 
Launching developed 
Symbian version 
Anssi Vanjoki, Nokia 
executive 
36 
Business 
blog 19.3.10 
Sramana Mitra 
website 
Nokia in The United 
States 
Products not 
innovative/appealing 
enough   
Sramana Mitra, 
business blogger 
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37 
News 
article 30.4.10 Kauppalehti 
Nokialla on kiire 
USA:ssa Intense competition 
More focus on US 
(analyst's opinion) 
Neil Mawston, 
Leading analyst, 
Strategy Analytics 
          
Nokia lacks competitive 
models 
Launching a US 
specific high-end 
model (analyst's 
opinion) -||- 
38 
News 
article 11.7.10 YLE Uutiset 
Nouseeko nokia taas 
kerran kriisistään? Weak brand in the US 
Focus on visibility and 
marketing in the US 
(author's opinion) 
Dan Steinbock, 
author, director of 
India, China, America 
institute 
          
Application offering not 
attractive 
Develop Ovi store to 
be more attractive 
(author's opinion) -||- 
39 
Business 
blog 9.8.10 Fortune 
Why Nokia's Android 
snub is a big mistake 
Sticking to Symbian (and 
Meego) 
Change to an OS with 
wide industry and 
developer support 
such as Android 
(Journalist's opinion) 
JP Mangalindan, 
journalist 
40 
News 
article 10.9.10 Fortune 
Can Stephen Elop Fix 
Nokia? Outdated Symbian OS   
Jessi Hempel, 
journalist 
41 
News 
article 12.9.10 
CNBC Money 
Control 
Key problems facing 
new Nokia CEO Elop 
Lack of tailoring for 
operators   Reuters 
          
Reliance on outdated 
Symbian   -||- 
          Weak developer base   -||- 
42 
Business 
blog 10.10.10 Forbes.com 
Five Big Questions 
About Nokia’s New CEO Operator relations   
Elisabeth Woyke, 
Journalist, Forbes 
          Symbian platform   -||- 
43 
Business 
blog 
23.10.20
10 
Smartphone 
experst Ltd 
Nokia is paying attention 
to North America, 
launches new contest 
with AT&T 
Lack of commitment to the 
North American market 
Nokia launched a 
competition together 
with AT&T to develop 
software for North 
American market  
Purnima Kockikar, VP 
Forum Nokia at CTIA, 
Matthew Miller, 
Columnist 
44 
News 
article 9.11.10 Infoworld 
Microsoft and Nokia: A 
tale of two elephants 
Slowness in Symbian & 
Meego development   
Galen Gruman, 
Journalist 
45 
News 
article 19.1.11 Tietoviikok 
Meego näyttää teille 
vielä, lupaa Nokia 
Symbian platform (difficulty 
in developing applications) 
Develop Meego to 
offer better user 
experience and 
possibilities for 
developers 
Ari Jaaksi, Nokia 
head of Meego 
development 
          Lagging application store   -||- 
          Operators' dominance   -||- 
46 
News 
article 18.3.11 SvD Näringsliv 
Avtal med Microsoft 
stärker Nokia i USA   
Adopted Windows 
Phone 7 (to 
differentiate and gain 
from Microsoft's 
brand) Strategy Analytics 
47 
News 
article 24.3.11 Networkworld 
Nokia looks to make 
Windows Phone 7 
hottest mobile OS on 
the planet   
Nokia launched Nokia 
Astound phone 
tailored for T-Mobile 
USA 
Kai Öistämö, Nokia 
Executive Vice 
President 
            
Join forces with 
Microsoft to jointly 
develop Nokia 
phones running 
Windows Phone 7 -||- 
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Appendix III. Reviewed annual reports 
 
Annual 
report  Why not succesful in the US / actions taken by Nokia 
2002 (no discussion on the U.S. market and/or actions taken) 
2003 CDMA technology one focus area 
2004 Launched a high performance CDMA phone 6255 and an EDGE phone 
6620 for the North American market 
2005 Launched first operator-tailored phones 6102 and 6234 
2006 11 new CDMA phones, opened two research centers in the US 
2007 
launched 6555 together with AT&T, launched several new CDMA 
phones 
2008 (no discussion on the U.S. market and/or actions taken) 
2009 (no discussion on the U.S. market and/or actions taken) 
2010 (no discussion on the U.S. market and/or actions taken) 
2011 (no discussion on the U.S. market and/or actions taken) 
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Appendix IV.  Categories in secondary data 
   
1-2 3-4 5-7 
8-
10 
11-
14 
15-
18 
19-
23 
24-
33 
34-
44 
45-
47 
 
  Explanation category Source number 2002 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10 '11 Total 
1 
Problems in operator 
cooperation / operator 
market power 
3, 7, 8, 15, 16, 18, 23, 
24, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 
33, 42, 45, B2, B3   1 1 1   3 1 7 2 1 17 
2 
Nokia focused on GSM 
while CDMA is 
preferred in the U.S. 
1, 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 
17, 22, 23, 28, B2 1 1   2 3 1 2 2     12 
3 
Symbian related 
problems 
29, 31, 33, 35, 39, 40, 
41, 42, 44, 45               3 6 1 10 
4 
Lack of tailored 
products for operators 
or U.S. market 
7,11,14,19,24,27,28,34,
41,B3     1   2   1 3 3   10 
5 
Lack of clamshell 
phones 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 33*     3 1 1     1     6 
6 
Intense/intensified 
competition 21, 23, 26, 29, 33, 37             2 3 1   6 
7 
Phone design does not 
attract American 
consumers 8, 15, 34, B2       1   1   1 1   4 
8 
Too few high-end 
models available 26, 30, 34, 37               2 2   4 
9 
Offering not 
compealing/innovat. 16, 23, 36, 38 
     
1 1 
 
2 
 
4 
10 
Too few models 
represented by 
operators 10, 16, 22       1   1 1       3 
11 
Application 
development 
environment 36, 41, 45                 2 1 3 
12 
Nokia phones not 
subsidized 17, 34           1     1   2 
13 
Weak presence in the 
market 20     1           1   2 
14 
Lack of 
focus/commitment 6, 43     1         1     2 
15 Weak brand 38                 1   1 
16 Recession 23                 1   1 
17 
Different consumption 
habits 34                 1   1 
18 
Organizational changes 
in Nokia B2               1     1 
19 
Disputes with 
Qualcomm B2               1     1 
  TOTAL   1 1 6 5 6 5 7 18 22 2 73 
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Appendix V. Nokia’s responses 
 
   
1-2 3-4 5-7 8-10 
11-
14 15-18 19-23 24-33 34-44 45-47 
 
  Nokia's action Source number 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Sum 
1 
Lauched tailored 
phones for 
operators or U.S. 
market 
7, 11, 14, 16, 18, 
19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 
27, 46, B2, B3, 
AR04, AR05, AR07     2 1 2 3 3 4 1 1 17 
2 
More focus on 
operator 
cooperation 
8, 14, 24, 25, 27, 
28, 43, B1       1 1     4 1   7 
3 
Launched new 
CDMA phones 
10, 13, 22, AR04, 
AR06, AR07     1 1 2 1 1       6 
4 
Launched 
clamshell phones 7, 11     1   1           2 
5 
Increased 
presence in the 
US 24, AR06         1     1     2 
6 
Adopted 
Windows Phone 
7 46, 47                   2 2 
7 
Cooperation with 
Sanyo to 
produce CDMA 
phones 11, 12         2           2 
8 
Promised to 
develop Symbian 
to match 
expectations 35                 1   1 
9 
Promised to 
develop Meego 45                   1 1 
  TOTAL   0 0 1 0 4 0 0 1 1 3 10 
 
